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THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE'S
PASSIVE VIRTUES
SHARON B.JACOBS*

Fift years ago, Alexander Bickelfamousy suggested that courts use tools like standing,
ripeness, and the political question doctrine to avoid reaching the merits of difficult cases.
Yet despite the increasingly central role of administrative agencies in government, there
have been no efforts to date to apply Bickel's insights to the bureaucracy. This Article
remedies that deficit. The Article provides a three-part taxonomy of administrative
restraint and offers case studies from federal agencies such as the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, the EnvironmentalProtectionAgency, and the Fish and Wildlife
Service. It argues that agencies sometimes use restraintstrategicallyfor reasons similar to
Bickelian courts: to avoid unnecessay conflict with other institutionalactors. Moreover,
like the passive virtues in the judicial arena, such agency passivity is often normatively
desirable. As long as certain internal agency safeguards exist, passivity should be
facilitated ratherthan undermined by reviewing courts.
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The better part of valour is discretion. I
INTRODUCTION

Consider the following three examples of agency behavior:

1.

*

First, consider the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's)
assertion in its denial of petitions to regulate greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions from new cars and trucks that it was under no
obligation to make a judgment about whether those emissions
endangered public health and welfare. 2 After the Supreme
Court disagreed in Massachusetts v. EPA, the agency ultimately
issued an endangerment finding and chose to phase in,
gradually, the regulation of mobile and stationary emissions
sources.

*

Next, consider the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's
(FERC's) approach to encouraging competition in electricity
markets.
Because transmission is a natural monopoly and
generation of electricity is not, FERC set out to separate, or
unbundle, sales of transmission service from sales of the actual
electrons transmitted. However, in Order 888, the major order
on unbundling, FERC focused on the wholesale market only
and did not require unbundling of retail transmission from retail
sales. Citing the existence of "difficult jurisdictional issues," the
Commission postponed resolution of the retail unbundling

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRST PART OF KING HENRY THE FoURTH act 5, sc.

3 at 119-20 (Jonathan Bate & Eric Rasmussen eds., Modem Library 2009).

2. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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question to another day.3
Finally, consider the Fish and Wildlife Service's (FWS's)
approach to species listing and critical habitat designation under
the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The ESA provides for the
listing of species as endangered or threatened when certain
statutory criteria are met. For each species so listed, the habitat
that is considered critical to the survival of the species must then
be designated. 4 However, for several species, FWS has deferred
these determinations in favor of cooperative agreements with
private parties.
One way to understand these behaviors is as evidence of administrative
inaction or delay, which have been the subject of almost universal
disapprobation in the literature. Inertia and torpor have been called
"inherent vices (even pathologies)" of the bureaucracy. 5 Some scholars
have focused on an agency's susceptibility to "corrosive influences when it
refuses to act."' 6 Others suggest that the very existence of agency delay
signals a principal-agent problem. 7
Still others recommend the
establishment of specialized review bodies whose sole purpose would be to
ensure timely agency action. 8
The work of Alexander Bickel presents another possible frame for
thinking about these examples. Half a century ago, Bickel famously
suggested that courts sometimes exercise the "passive virtues" by invoking
justiciability doctrines and other techniques in order to avoid reaching the
merits of difficult cases. 9 But while "ripeness," "mootness," and "political
3. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and
Transmitting Utilities, 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 385 (1997) [hereinafter Order 888].
4.

See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1532 (2012).

5. Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration,114 HARv. L. REV. 2245, 2263 (2001).
6. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An ArbitrarinessApproach, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1661 (2004).
7. Michael D. Sant'Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent Approach Can Inform
Judicialand Executive Branch Review ofAgency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 1381, 1442
(2011) (suggesting that courts adopt a presumption that rulemaking proceedings lasting
longer than two years have been unreasonably delayed).

8.

Glen Staszewski, The Federal Inaction Commission, 59 EMORY LJ. 369 (2009)

(proposing the creation of a new independent agency to police agency inaction).
9. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed.
1986) [hereinafter BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH]; see also Alexander M. Bickel,

Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REV. 40 (1961) [hereinafter Bickel, Passive Virtues].
For recent discussions of Bickel's impact on legal thinking see, for example, Special Feature:
Alexander Bickel Symposium, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/ category/special-
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questions" are now part of the legal vernacular, we lack a similar taxonomy
for administrative prudence. Like courts, administrative agencies faced with
difficult decisions sometimes simply decide not to decide. Also like courts,
agencies take prudential considerations into account when deciding not
only how to act but whether and when to do so. This exercise of
bureaucratic discretion is the administrative analog to Bickel's "passive
virtues."
The application of Bickel's insight to agencies is long overdue. The
meteoric rise of the administrative state, first during the New Deal and then
in the 1960s and 1970s, has produced a modem bureaucracy that rivals the
courts as an organ of day-to-day policymaking.' 0 Despite the bureaucracy's
growth, uncertainty remains as to the source of its legitimacy. The
Constitution is nearly silent on the subject of administrative agencies.
Agencies, like courts, also lack direct ties to the electorate, limiting
accountability as a justificatory mechanism. Partly as a result of these
features, agencies are subject to a multitude of influences and constraints
from other governmental actors and from the public.
To navigate these external pressures, this Article argues, agencies must be
pragmatic and strategic in the exercise of their authority. Here, restraint is
an essential tool. Deferring decisions or taking small steps rather than
aggressive ones can be useful where more decisive action would expose the
agency to damaging backlash. 1I

features/alexander-bickel-symposium/ (last updated Aug. 21, 2012) [hereinafter Bickel
Symposium].
10. See Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts,
47 DuKE LJ. 1013, 1019 (1998). Sunstein argues that administrative agencies "have
become modern America's common law courts, and properly so." Id.; see also Lars Noah,
Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts. Misplaced Metaphors in Administrative Law, 41 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1463, 1464 (2000) ("More so than do the courts, federal agencies exercise pervasive
control over economic and other activities in this country."). While Noah agrees with
Sunstein that the role of administrative agencies has expanded dramatically, he takes
exception to the idea that agencies should perform the role of common law courts. Id. at
1505-06.
11. It was pragmatic need rather than principle, after all, which led to the
administrative state we have today. For an argument that necessity not only explains the
administrative state's evolution but should constrain the exercise of its powers, see Michael
Ray Harris, Breaking the Gnp of the Administrative Triad: Agency Policy Making Under a NecessityBased Doctrine, 86 TUL. L. REV. 273 (2011). Ronald Levin has offered a defense of
administrative law pragmatism as a tool for social problem-solving. See Ronald M. Levin,
Administrative Law Pragmatism, 37 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 227, 231, 234-35 (2011) (describing
administrative law pragmatism as "a belief in trying to accomplish social ends effectively
through the use of the administrative process"); see also Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law
After the Counter-Reformation: Restoring Faith in Pragmatic Government, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 689,
737-48 (2000) (proposing pragmatism as the proper lens through which to evaluate
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A more difficult question is how to reconcile the administrative state's
passive virtues with traditional understandings of faithful agency and with
the view that agency decisions must be driven primarily by technocratic
expertise. In the short term, agencies exercising strategic restraint might
appear to be diverging from statutory purposes or refusing to follow where
the evidence leads. In the longer term, however, it may sometimes be the
case that agencies can only remain true to legislative mandates by
controlling the timing and extent of their decisions. Agencies possess
practical as well as technocratic expertise, and they would be abdicating
their statutory responsibilities were they to ignore the practical
consequences of their decisions. As Bickel argued with respect to courts, it
might sometimes be preferable for an agency to demur when faced with a
choice between strict adherence to "principle" and producing a decision
whose real world effects are likely to be inconsistent with statutory goals.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I offers an overview of Bickel's
theory of the passive virtues and connects the theory to the larger literature
on leaving questions undecided. It then elaborates a three-part taxonomy
of agency restraint illustrated through case studies. First, it examines
"decisions not to decide." The EPA's initial decision not to make a
judgment about whether GHGs endanger public health and welfare falls
within this category. The second type of agency restraint examined is stepby-step regulation. Here, agencies resolve some questions while leaving
others open.
One example is FERC's unbundling of wholesale
transmission from sales of electricity while declining to decide whether
retail unbundling should occur. The third category might be called
administrative minimalism. A minimalist agency defers more controversial
decisions by taking less contentious steps. Under Interior Secretary Bruce
Babbitt, for example, FWS entered into voluntary agreements with private
parties to avoid deciding whether certain species should be listed as
threatened or endangered under the ESA.
Part II explores the motivations behind agency restraint. While the
conventional wisdom is that agency inaction is the product of lassitude,
personal bias, or interest group influence, the Article posits a less nefarious
explanation of restraint. Returning to the Bickelian passive virtues, it
argues that agencies sometimes elect restraint over aggressive action to
avoid backlash and to preserve their own political capital. This Part also
presents a normative justification for agency restraint. It argues that, as
long as the agency is ultimately motivated by the desire to effectuate
statutory goals over the long term, restraint is a virtue rather than a vice.
Part III suggests that confining the influence of restraint to the first stage
administrative law).
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in the administrative decisionmaking process (where the agency determines
whether and when to tackle a given question) will actually preserve
technocratic expertise by leaving the decision about what course of action to
take place free from prudential considerations.
It also makes two
prescriptive suggestions that follow from the positive and normative claims.
First, it argues that reviewing courts should accommodate the prudential
considerations that inform bureaucratic decisionmaking. Second, in order
to tease out justified from unjustified restraint, we should encourage
agencies to be more transparent about their reasons for deferring action.
This mechanism will never be error-proof, as motivation is notoriously hard
to discern. However, given that a default must be set one way or the other,
it is better to err on the side of allowing a few poorly motivated cases of
restraint to slip through than for courts to sharply limit the exercise of
agency restraint.
I.

BICKELIAN COURTS, BICKELIAN AGENCIES

Alexander Bickel drew on a larger tradition when he posited the idea of
the passive virtues in the early 1960s. His theory offered a helpful
description of judicial behavior, but its utility is not limited to the courts.
Agencies, too, have discretion over the content of their "docket." In the
absence of mandatory statutory provisions, they control the timing and
scope of their decisions. Three ways in which they do this are by deferring
decisions wholesale, by attacking problems step-by-step, and by regulating
minimally as opposed to maximally.
A.

TraditionalBickelian Passive Virtues

Alexander Bickel is perhaps best known for his work on judicial
restraint. 12 Along with other constitutional scholars of his era, Bickel was
primarily concerned with justifying the role of judges in society, and
especially with justifying judicial review of legislative enactments. Bickel's
first move was to tell the story of judges as they actually behaved. He
eschewed both the classical view of judges as paragons of impartiality and
the realist instinct that they were unprincipled men and women guided only
by preconception and passion. Bickel then built on this more practical
foundation by embracing an understanding of judging as an inherently
flexible enterprise.
According to Bickel, Marbury v. Madison's lesson-that a court assessing a

12. Bickel was not the first to write about judicial modesty. He acknowledges his debt
to James Bradley Thayer's "clear error" rule in particular. BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH, supra note 9, at 35.
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statute's validity may legitimate the statute by finding it consistent with the
Constitution or may strike it down as unconstitutional-was incomplete. 13
A court, Bickel suggested, might also "do neither," postponing a decision
on the question to another day. 14 Bickel proceeded to elaborate on the
"doing neither" option, cataloging the tools the Supreme Court used to
avoid decisions on the merits. On his list were not only standing, ripeness,
and mootness but also the political question doctrine, the Supreme Court's
discretionary certiorari jurisdiction, and the Court's prerogative to
summarily affirm or reverse the judgments of lower courts.
Without this flexibility to decide not only "which principles and how, but
also, when and in what circumstances,"' 15 Bickel explained, the Court
risked three things. First, by jumping into the fray on controversial social
issues, it risked engendering opposition and undermining its own
legitimacy.
Second, the Court risked undermining the integrity and
consistency of the principles it articulated. Third, it risked intruding
impermissibly into the domains of electorally accountable government
actors.
Two major criticisms have been levelled at Bickel. The first, from
Gerald Gunther, is that Bickel's treatment of principle was internally
inconsistent. Famously, Gunther quipped that Bickel wanted the Court to
be 100% principled, but only 20% of the time. 16 It is true that Bickel
embraced, to some extent, the idea of Wechslerian principle in judicial
decisionmaking. And it is also true that Bickelian "passivity" was not
governed by the same set of principles as judicial action. However, Bickel
not only acknowledged but embraced this friction. He repeatedly invoked
what he called the "Lincolnian tension" between principle and
expediency, 17 by which he meant the eternal tension between decisional
consistency and the practical necessities of governance. In Bickel's words,
"[n]o good society can be unprincipled; and no viable society can be
principle-ridden." 18
13. Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803).
14. BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 9, at 69.
15. Bickel, Passive Virtues, supra note 9, at 41.
16. Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Pincple and
Expediency in JudicialReview, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1964).
17. See, e.g., BICKEt, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 9, at 65; Bickel, Passive
Virtues, supra note 9, at 50.
18. Bickel, Passive Virtues, supra note 9, at 49.

ADMINISTRATIVE LA wREVEW

[66:3

The second major criticism of Bickel comes from Mark Tushnet. In a
2002 article, Tushnet argued that the circumstances that gave rise to
justiciability doctrines as "appropriate vehicles for prudential judgments"
have changed. 19 The Court as an institution is no longer under threat,
Tushnet claimed, and thus the need for prudence is muted. 20 But the
Court's own assessment of its continuing need to safeguard its legitimacy
through the use of restraint apparently differs from Tushnet's. Put another
way, rumors of the death of the passive virtues have been greatly
exaggerated. As one commentator remarked, "it is impossible to miss
Bickel's long shadow looming over the contemporary Court." 2' 1 And Chief
Justice John Roberts makes no secret of his support for the practice of
deciding cases narrowly if necessary to achieve consensus. 22 During the
October 2013 term, the Court dodged a decision on affirmative action 23 as
19. Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and
Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203, 1205 (2002). Tushnet
points out, for example, that justiciability doctrines were not even mentioned in Bush v. Gore,
which was precisely the kind of politically charged case where we might have expected the
justices to invoke the political question doctrine to avoid reaching the merits. Id.
20. Id. at 1234. Tushnet also claimed that the jurisdictional techniques Bickel
described have been thoroughly doctrinalized so that their invocation no longer represents a
truly discretionary judgment but one governed by general, neutral standards. Id. at 1205.
Thus, to paraphrase Tushnet, Bickel's allegedly prudential decisions have collapsed into
Wechslerian principle. Id. at 1204. On this point, Tushnet may well be correct. One of the
consequences of naming and studying the jurisdictional tools to avoid decisionmaking was to
domesticate them. Precedential norms surrounding their application have developed that,
to some extent, circumscribe their use as prudential devices. But, as described below, the
administrative state's discretion to defer decisionmaking is not so encumbered.
21. Steve Vladeck, Online Alexander Bickel Symposium: The Passive Virtues as Means, Not Ends,
SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 21, 2012, 12:32 PM), http://www.scotus
blog.com/2012/08/online-alexander-bickel-symposium-the-passive-virtues-as-means-notends/ (remarking that the current Court has flexed its muscle in recent terrorism-related
detainee decisions but only to protect the judicial power, not to decide the merits of
individual cases).
22. See Michael C. Doff, ChiefJustice Roberts Advocates the Passive Virtues, Even as the Supreme
Court's
Docket
Reveals
their
Subtle
Vices,
WRIT
(Nov.
20,
2006),
http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/dorf/20061120.html.
Consensus is itself a legitimacyreinforcing device. As Jeffrey Rosen suggested in an article on the Chief Justice, divided
decisions "make it harder for the public to respect the Court as an impartial institution that
transcends partisan politics." Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts's Rules, THE ATLANTIC Jan. 1, 2007),
available at http:/ /www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007 / 1/robertss-rules
/305559.
23. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); see Jess Bravin, Justices
Take Pass on Texas Affirmative-Action Case, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2013), available at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424127887324412604578517602559504498
("[T]he justices reached near unanimity only by bypassing the core question in affirmativeaction cases-whether racial diversity qualifies as a compelling government objective
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well as California's Proposition 8, which prohibited gay marriage. 24 Other
scholars have noted the Court's restraint in deciding cases that touch on the
25
war on terrorism.
Bickel's original conception of judicial prudence also survives in the legal
academy. Bickel's core ideas have followers from across the political and
ideological spectrum, including Robert Bork, 26 Samuel Alito, 27 Louis
Michael Seidman, 28 and Cass Sunstein. 29 A recent Bickel symposium is a
testament to his continued scholarly relevance. 30 Moreover, Bickel's
insights were part of a continuum of ideas about judicial restraint that can
trace its roots to scholars such as James Bradley Thayer 3l and Edmund
Burke3 2 and that has been carried forward in work on judicial minimalism

justifying preferential treatment").
24. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); see Eugene Volokh, The Roberts Court
and the Passive Virtues, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 23, 2006, 11:17 AM),
http://volokh.com/2006/01/23/the-roberts-court-and-the-passive-virtues/
(noting the
Court's remands on narrow grounds in two cases, one dealing with abortion and the other
with campaign finance).
25. See Vladeck, supra note 21 (noting that the Court has preserved its jurisdiction over
terrorism cases while declining to actually decide the issues before it).
26. See Abner J. Mikva, Why Judges Should Not be Advicegivers: A Response to Professor Neal
Ka~yal, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1825, 1825 (1998) ("Because Bickel had no ideological axes to
grind, such diverse judges as Robert Bork and I could find sustenance in his views.");
Thomas C. Arthur, The Influence of Levi's Legal Process on Bork's The Antitrust Paradox, 17
Miss. C. L. REV. 124, 125 (1996) ("Bickel was [Bork's] best friend and intellectual
companion."). While Bork embraced Bickel's premise that the judiciary's lack of electoral
accountability posed a threat to democracy and agreed that judges should be restrained in
the exercise of their power, he would have resolved that threat by requiring adherence to the
original meaning of statutory text. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990).

27. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an AssociateJustice of
the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciay, 109th Cong. 381 (2006)
(statement of Samuel A. Alito) ("[Bickel] was a great proponent of judicial self-restraint, and
that was the main point that I took from my pre-law school study of the Warren court.").
28. See Louis Michael Seidman, Online Alexander Bickel Symposium: Too Principledto Stand on
Principle?,SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 14, 2012, 11:01 AM), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2012/08/online-bickel-symposium-too-principled-to-stand-on-principle/
(admitting
that Bickel may have "sold his legal soul" but praising him for having done it "for the sake of
racial justice").
29. See CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME:JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 6, n.5 (1999) (acknowledging the obvious parallels between the book's argument and
Bickel's approach in THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH); see also Tushnet, supra note 19, at
1233 (describing Sunstein as "Bickel's jurisprudential heir").
30. Bickel Symposium, supra note 9.
31. Bickel discusses Thayer's approach at length in THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH.

BICKEL, supra note 9,at 35-45.
32. See Cass R. Sunstein, BurkeanMinimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006).
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by Sunstein and others. 33
Yet surprisingly, the role of the passive virtues in modern government's
most active and arguably most influential branch remains largely
unstudied. It is therefore to the role of the passive virtues in administrative
decisionmaking that the Article now turns.
B. Bickelian Agencies
The world has changed since Bickel was writing in the 1960s. Courts
are no longer the only, or even the dominant, translators of general
statutory pronouncements into more specific guidance. That role belongs
to the administrative state, a vast bureaucracy of agencies and commissions
in which the majority of law formation, interpretation, and enforcement
34
actually takes place.
It is therefore high time to apply Bickel's insights to agencies. Agencies,
like courts, cannot behave as if there are no other actors in the system.
Indeed, they would be abdicating their statutory responsibilities if they
failed to consider the practical consequences of their decisions on their
relationships with those actors. Agencies are responsible for coordinating
programs and policies whose scope and importance eclipse any single
decision and for ensuring that those programs and policies endure over the
longer term. These responsibilities make strategic inaction an important
tool in the agency arsenal.
Administrative restraint can be explicit, for example where an agency
documents its decision not to decide in the denial of a petition for
rulemaking or in response to comments on a proposed rule. An agency
might even announce its choice publicly, as the State Department recently
did when it elected not to determine whether the ouster of Egyptian
President Mohammed Morsi was a "coup. ' 35 These cases are the most

33.
34.

See infra
notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
On the growth of the administrative bureaucracy

SKOWRONEK,

BUILDING

A NEW AMERICAN

generally, see STEPHEN

STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL

ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877-1920 (1982). Gary Lawson takes a less sanguine view of
this development. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARv. L.
REV. 1231, 1231 (1994) ("Faced with a choice between the administrative state and the
Constitution, the architects of our modem government chose the administrative state, and
their choice has stuck."); see also JOHN MARINI, THE POLITICS OF BUDGET CONTROL:
CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENCY, AND THE GROWTH OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE ix (1992)

("The administrative state rests upon theoretical assumptions that cannot gain constitutional
legitimacy.").
35. Briefing By State Department Spokesperson Jen Psaki, (July 26, 2013), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2013/07/212484.htm# ("We have determined that
we do not need to make a determination...").
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striking, although they are relatively rare. Restraint can also be implicit, as
where the agency takes some steps, either deciding some questions while
leaving others open or making an easier decision to avoid a more difficult
one. What distinguishes these cases from the multiplicity of situations in
which agencies take action that falls short of the most aggressive option is
that the restraint takes place prior to a decision on the merits. At this
earlier decisional stage, the agency determines that it is more pragmatic to
substitute a less controversial choice for a more controversial one.
While the administrative equivalents of the court's jurisdictional
doctrines are perhaps less easily captured in tidy phrases, the reality is that
These
agencies possess powerful tools to avoid decisionmaking. 36
techniques fall into three categories. First, agencies can avoid entire issues
by deciding not to decide whether action is warranted. Second, agencies
can resolve some questions while leaving others undecided. Finally,
agencies might take modest steps to address a problem to avoid more
controversial choices.
1. Decisions Not to Decide
The first category of agency restraint concerns "decisions not to decide."
Here, agencies avoid addressing difficult questions wholesale rather than
taking even minimal steps toward their resolution. These choices often
involve triggering decisions, which are those decisions that, once made, lead
to subsequent, mandatory actions.
In one prominent decision not to decide, EPA contended that it was
under no obligation to decide whether GHGs from new cars and trucks
7
endangered public health and welfare under the Clean Air Act (CAA).3
Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA states that the EPA Administrator

36. By the passive virtues, I mean a concept distinct from mere inaction. Lisa
Bressman, for example, defines inaction as encompassing "any instance in which an agency
fails to take desired or desirable action." Bressman, supra note 6, at 1664. Inaction, so
defined, is both too broad and too narrow for the purposes of this Article. It is too broad
because it covers "merits" decisions to maintain the status quo (such as a decision that
greenhouse gases (GHGs) do not endanger public health and welfare). And it is too narrow
because it does not encompass step-by-step regulation or administrative minimalism, where
agencies resolve some issues while leaving others undecided or take less controversial
decisions to avoid more controversial ones. There are, of course, situations that fit both
definitions, such as where an agency declines to make a statutory triggering decision or
simply fails to act on a petition for rulemaking. For clarity, however, this Article will refer to
agency "restraint" rather than "inaction."
37. As will be discussed below, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has had
more success with this strategy in subsequent denials of petitions to regulate GHG emissions
from other mobile sources.
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shall by regulation prescribe ... standards applicable to the emission of any
air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor
vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution
38
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.
Once the Administrator has made a positive determination under this
section, called an "endangerment finding," he or she is legally obligated to
39
set limits on emissions of the pollutant.
In 1999, environmental groups petitioned the EPA to regulate GHG
emissions under § 202(a)(1). 40 The EPA ultimately denied the petition. 4 1 In
its denial, it first disavowed authority over GHG emissions under the CAA,
arguing that GHGs were not "air pollutants" as contemplated by the
CAA.42 Alternatively, EPA argued that even if it had jurisdiction over GHG
emissions, it would have invoked its discretion not to make the triggering
finding that emissions from new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle
engines cause or contribute to GHG pollution that threatens the public
health or welfare. 43 In essence, EPA decided that it was under no duty to
exercise its judgment on the question, and that it would be unwise to do so
at that time.
. In 2007, the Supreme Court held in Massachusetts v. EPA that GHGs
were "air pollutants" as defined by the CAA and that EPA abused its
discretion in declining to make a judgment about the effects on public
health and welfare of GHG emissions from motor vehicles. 44 Once EPA
decided to respond to a petition for rulemaking, the Court held "its reasons
45
for action or inaction must conform to the authorizing statute."
Following the 2008 presidential elections, EPA has continued to exercise
restraint in the regulation of GHGs, albeit in a more targeted way. For
example, EPA delayed its response to, and finally denied, petitions seeking
the regulation of GHG emissions from non road and marine sources. In its
denials, EPA explained that it did "not intend at this time to initiate either
an endangerment finding or a rulemaking regarding emissions of
greenhouse gases and black carbon from nonroad engines and vehicles,

38. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (emphasis added).
39. Id.
40. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510 (2007).
41. Id. at 511.
42. Id. at 512-13.
43. Id. at 513.
44. Id. at 532-34.
45. Id. at 533. Below, I will suggest that this conclusion was in error, and that courts
should permit agencies to consider a broader array of criteria in deciding whether to decide
than agencies would be permitted to consider in actually making the relevant judgment, at
least where permitted by statutory text.
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including marine engines and vessels... in the near or medium term. '46
Non-enforcement decisions might also be described as decisions not to
decide. When an agency decides not to pursue an alleged violation of a
statute or rule, it makes no determination as to whether a violation actually
occurred. Instead, it chooses not to investigate. In Heckler v. Chaney, for
example, a group of death row inmates petitioned the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to enforce its prohibition of the "off-label" use of
drugs by barring the use of a drug cocktail in lethal injections.47 When
FDA declined to take the requested action, respondents appealed. The
Supreme Court sided with FDA and took the opportunity to announce a
general presumption that judicial review of an agency's decision not to
initiate an enforcement action is unavailable. 48 The Court cited three
primary justifications for this presumption: an agency's superior expertise in
allocating its limited resources among enforcement priorities, the lesser
coercive impact of inaction as opposed to action, and the similarity of
agency enforcement actions to prosecutorial discretion, an area where the
49
executive has traditionally been granted near total discretion.
A decision not to decide can also manifest as delay. For example, the
Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) deferred the issuance of a
final rule governing permissible levels of diesel exhaust gases in
underground mines for several years. The question was ultimately litigated,
at which point the agency explained its delay by stating that it was occupied
with other rulemakings that it concluded, and plaintiffs agreed, would more
directly and beneficially impact miners' health. 50 In another delay case,
Sierra Club v. Thomas, the Sierra Club challenged EPA's failure to conclude a
rulemaking concerning whether to list strip mines as a source subject to
fugitive emissions regulation under the CAA.51 Noting that more than
three years had passed since EPA initially proposed its rulemaking, the
Sierra Club sought a writ of mandamus requiring EPA to make its decision
within ninety days. The question of whether to add strip mines as a
regulated source of fugitive emissions was a controversial one, pitting
industry against environmental groups with EPA caught in the middle. 52

46. Memorandum in Response to Petitions Regarding Greenhouse Gas and Other Emissions from
Marine Vessels andNonroadEngines and Vehicles (June 18, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/
assets/2012/06/18/documentpm_06.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum in Response to Petitions].
47. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
48. Id. at 832-33.
49. Id. at 831-32.
50. In re United Mine Workers of Am. Int'l Union, 190 F.3d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
51. Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783 (1987).
52. See Guy Darst, EPA Pollution Proposal Sparks Suits, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 26, 1984
(describing industry and environmental group positions on proposed regulation).
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Recognizing this, the D.C. Circuit ultimately declined to grant the Sierra
Club injunctive relief.53 The court noted that extra time to consider
whether to list strip mines was warranted given the "highly controversial
nature of the proposal." 54 It also remarked that additional time to gather
information and conduct research to support a decision would allow EPA
to reduce the "risk of later judicial invalidation." 55
Decisions not to decide tend to be particularly useful where the subject
matter at issue is especially controversial. By deferring all regulatory steps,
an agency might stay out of the spotlight long enough to accumulate
information to better support its ultimate decision (as EPA did with respect
to strip mines). There is also the possibility that deferring a decision might
allow a more accountable government actor step in, obviating the need for
agency action. With respect to GHG regulation, for example, players on
all sides of the debate acknowledged that the CAA's language was not
perfectly suited to regulate GHGs, and many were hoping that Congress
would step in and amend the statute. Some hoped that Congress would
make clear that the CAA contemplated regulation of GHGs, while others
desired a plainer statement that such regulation was precluded. However,
there was general agreement on the desirability of legislative intervention.
Deciding not to decide also preserves the option of regulating in the
future. One of the reasons EPA offered for its decision not to decide
whether GHGs from non road and marine engines endangered public
health and welfare was that it was prioritizing discretionary actions that
would affect the largest contributors to GHG emissions in the United
States. 56 However, EPA was clearly not interested in making a finding that
emissions from these sources did not contribute to carbon pollution. By
deferring the question, the agency left its options open. 57 Similarly, with
respect to regulating diesel exhaust levels in mines, although MHSA was
prioritizing other approaches to improving miners' health, it was not
suggesting that it would never promulgate standards.

53.
54.

55.
56.

Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d at 799.
Id.
Id. at 798-99.
Memorandum in Response to Petitions, supra note 46.

57. In its earlier ruling on plaintiffs' claim that EPA had unreasonably delayed its
response to the petitions, the D.C. Circuit agreed with EPA that the agency was under no
obligation to determine whether emissions from non road and marine sources should be
regulated. See Memorandum in Response to Petitions, supra note 46, at I 1-12 (emphasis added).
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2. Step-by-Step Regulation
Agencies might also find it prudent to resolve some aspects of a problem
while leaving others to another day. This approach might be called stepby-step regulation. Although there is some overlap between the categories
suggested in this section depending on how one defines the scope of a
problem or issue, it is helpful conceptually to separate incremental action
from outright decisions not to decide. Decisions not to decide will be more
useful where an issue is so controversial that any moves by the agency will
subject it to intense criticism and scrutiny. By contrast, step-by-step
regulation will allow the agency to enter the fray but to do so cautiously. It
is therefore a helpful strategy for testing the waters and for making progress
on an issue while avoiding regulatory fatigue.
FERC took such a step-by-step approach in a landmark order that
moved electricity markets toward a more competitive structure. In the
2002 case New York v. FERC, the Supreme Court upheld a decision by
FERC not to decide whether it had jurisdiction over the transmission of
electricity at the retail level (e.g. to individual consumers) when that
transmission was sold as part of a bundled product with the electricity
itself.58

New York v. FERC concerned FERC Order 888, which "unbundled" sales
of electricity by requiring utilities to price and sell wholesale electricity
separately from the transmission services required to move that electricity
from seller to buyer. FERC did this to promote competition in power
generation while preserving the natural monopoly in the transmission
industry. The unbundling was designed to ensure that new generators
entering the market would have non-discriminatory access to transmission
services so that their power could reach buyers. 59
Because FERC has jurisdiction over both wholesale sales of power in
interstate commerce (in other words, sales for resale) and interstate
transmission of power, it could regulate both pieces of this transaction.
However, sometimes retail sales of power (or sales to end users) are also sold
as a package with transmission services. Since states have jurisdiction over
retail sales, there was a question as to whether FERC could regulate the
transmission component of these transactions without first unbundling

58.

New Yorkv. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 25 (2002).

59. S. Cal. Edison Co. v. FERC, 603 F.3d 996, 997 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see also Order
888, supra note 3, at 21,577 ("Our approach to assuring... open access has two broad

requirements: (1) Functional unbundling of transmission and generation (which includes
separately

stated rates for generation,

transmission,

and ancillary

services, and

a

requirement that a transmission provider take service under its own tarifl), except for
bundled retail service ....).
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them.
FERC could have ordered the unbundling of retail sales and asserted
jurisdiction over the transmission component of those sales. It could also
have allowed the sales to remain bundled, but asserted jurisdiction over the
entire transaction. Alternatively, FERC could have found that it lacked
jurisdiction to regulate bundled sales. However, FERC took none of these
60
steps, choosing instead to leave the jurisdictional question undecided.
This portion of Order 888 came under fire from independent producers
and wholesalers, who argued that FERC not only had jurisdiction to
require the de-coupling of retail sales from transmission, but that it was
required to do so and to regulate the transmission component. 61 FERC
disagreed, based on two separate arguments. Both arguments sounded in
prudence. First, in Order 888, FERC argued that although it would be
"helpful," it was "not necessary" at the time to unbundle distribution from
retail sales of energy in order to ensure non-discriminatory open access
transmission. 62 Second, the Commission found that asserting jurisdiction
over the transmission component of bundled retail sales would raise
"numerous difficult jurisdictional issues" that it felt would be better resolved
63
through case-by-case proceedings.
The case made its way up to the Supreme Court, which deferred to
FERC's decision not to investigate bundled retail sales and consequently
not to assert jurisdiction over transmission in that context. 64 If FERC had
investigated and confirmed the alleged discrimination in the retail
electricity market, the Court conceded, it would be required to remedy that
discrimination under § 206 of the Federal Power Act (FPA).65 But even if
FERC had jurisdiction under the FPA "to regulate the transmission
component of a bundled retail sale," the Court continued, "the agency had
discretion to decline to assert such jurisdiction in this proceeding in part
because of the complicated nature of the jurisdictional issues." 66 In essence,
the Court held, this decision "'represent[ed] a statutorily permissible policy
67
'Ichoice."'
60. New rorkv. FERC, 535 U.S. at 12.
61.
62.

Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,577.
Id.
63. Id. at 21,577-78. In 2011, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
expanded this reasoning to the sale of state renewable energy credits, deciding that it would
assert jurisdiction when sales of those credits were bundled with sales of wholesale energy,
but not when they were sold independently. WSPP Inc., ER12-1144-000, 139 FERC

61,061 (Apr. 20, 2012).
64.

New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 28.

65. Id. at 27.
66. Id. at 28.
67. Id. (citation omitted). Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Kennedy would have remanded
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The EPA's approach to the regulation of GHG emissions under
President Barack Obama provides another example of step-by-step
regulation. The Obama EPA has made no secret of its support for
68
controlling emissions of GHGs from both mobile and stationary sources.
Despite its enthusiasm, however, EPA's approach to date has been
incremental rather than comprehensive. 69
In December 2009, EPA made the key finding (sought by the petitioners
in Massachusetts v. EPA) that GHGs constitute a threat to public health and
welfare and that GHG emissions from motor vehicles cause and contribute
to that threat. 70 This "endangerment finding" triggered obligations to
regulate emissions from new cars and trucks. 71 Regulating vehicular
emissions, in turn, made GHGs "subject to regulation" under the CAA,
triggering a requirement for so-called "stationary sources," including power
plants, businesses, and even, potentially, residences, to seek permits for their
GHG emissions.
Under the CAA's Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD)
permitting program, only stationary sources that are "major" emitters of a
given pollutant, as measured by thresholds set in tons-per-year in the statute
itself, are required to seek a permit. 72 For all other regulated pollutants,
which are emitted in relatively small quantities, this meant that permitting
did not affect them and was limited to the largest sources. Gases like
the matter to FERC to determine whether or not undue discrimination in the retail markets
dictated that it assert jurisdiction over the transmission component of bundled retail
transactions. Id. at 42 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part). The dissenters would have found
that FERC's decision not to investigate was an impermissible policy choice not permitted by
the terms of the statute, and that FERC had failed to engage in "reasoned decisionmaking."

Id.
68. See, e.g., LisaJackson, Adm'r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, Remarks on the Endangerment
Finding on Greenhouse Gases (Dec. 7, 2009), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/
admpress.nsf/8d49f7ad4bbcf4efB52573590040b7f6/b6b7098bb 1dfaf9a85257685005483d5!
OpenDocument (noting that EPA was joining "millions of Americans and billions of global
citizens who have seen the overwhelming evidence and called for action on climate
change"); id. ("[Ifwe do not act to reduce greenhouse gases, the planet we leave to the next
generation will be a very different place than the one we know today"); see also Gina
McCarthy, Adm'r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, Remarks at Harvard University, Harvard Law
School (July 31, 2013), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/8d49f7ad4b
bcf4ef852573590040b7f6/be8f2d864287e57285257bb90067322a!OpenDocument.
69. The agency itself has described its approach as "common-sense."
Regulatory
Initiatives, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/regulatory-initiatives.
html (last visited June 2, 2014). Lisa Jackson has also referred 'to it as "pragmatic." See
Jackson, supra note 68.
70. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 40 C.F.R. ch. 1 (2010).
71. 42U.S.C.§7521(a)(2006&Supp.IV2011).
72. Id. § 7479(1) (defining "major emitting facility").
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carbon dioxide, however, are emitted in much larger quantities. Thus,
many more sources would be required to seek permits under the new rules,
including many businesses and even some large residences.
To avoid intense backlash from opponents and to address what could
otherwise be an administrative nightmare for state and federal permitting
authorities as well as the small stationary sources themselves, EPA took a
creative approach to the problem. It issued a "tailoring rule," proposing to
phase in, slowly, the permitting rules for smaller sources of GHGs. 73 As of
February 24, 2012, when EPA proposed its third step of the phase-in,
triggering thresholds remained high. 74 Thus, smaller sources have
continued to be excluded from the CAA's requirements, notwithstanding
EPA's clear obligation to regulate such sources under the language of the
statute. 75
Although the Supreme Court recently invalidated part of the tailoring
rule, 76 other aspects of EPA's step-by-step approach to GHG regulation
survive. For example, EPA has also postponed decisions about whether to
set National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for GHGs. The
endangerment finding arguably triggered the sections of the CAA that
require EPA to set GHG NAAQS at a level that would protect the public
health and welfare. 77 Setting national standards for GHGs, however, poses
significant practical difficulties.
Within three years after EPA has
determined what level of GHGs will protect public health and welfare with
an adequate margin of safety, 78 states would be required to submit an
implementation plan to EPA that detailed the steps they would take to
73. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 51 (June 3, 2010).
74. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule Step 3, GHG Plantwide Applicability Limitations and GHG Synthetic Minor

Limitations, 77 Fed. Reg. 14,226 (proposed Mar. 8, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 51).
75. EPA offered three legal justifications for its approach. First, EPA invoked the
"absurd results" doctrine, arguing that aggressive regulation under the letter of the statute
would be an absurd reading as Congress would not have wanted small entities to be
burdened with permit requirements. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V
Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 51. EPA also relied on the doctrines of
"administrative necessity" and the "one-step-at-a-time" doctrine, both of which, the agency
argued, gave it authority to phase in its GHG permitting program. Id. at 31,542.

76 See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, No. 12-1146, slip op. (U.S. June 23, 2014).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2006). For a collection of sources claiming that EPA must set
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for GHGs, see Patricia Ross McCubbin,

EPA's Endangerment Findingfor Greenhouse Gases and the PotentialDuty to Adopt National Ambient Air
Qualiy Standards to Address Global Climate Change, 33 S. ILL. U. LJ. 437, 452 (2009).
78. Determining the correct limit for pollutants like GHGs also poses special
challenges. See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed.

Reg. 44,354, 44,478 (July 30, 2008); see also McCubbin, supra note 77, at 444.
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implement, maintain, and enforce the standards. 7 9 GHGs, however,
become well-mixed once they are emitted into the atmosphere, meaning
that emissions from all over the globe contribute to the concentrations in
any one state. Thus, it would be impossible for a state, on its own, to
achieve any NAAQS for GHGs. 80 Moreover, the economic burden the
effort would impose on states would make any move to set NAAQS for
GHGs, in the words of one commentator, "politically impossible." 81 EPA
has therefore prudently deferred requests to set NAAQS for GHGs to
date.

82

3. Administrative Minimalism
Finally, agencies might avoid a particularly controversial decision or
action by making a different, less contentious choice. There are parallels
here to what Cass Sunstein has described, in the context of the courts, as
judicial minimalism. 83 Sunstein understands a minimalist judge to be one
who seeks "to avoid broad rules and abstract theories," focusing "attention
only on what is necessary to decide particular cases." 84 Minimalist
agencies, like minimalist courts, also seek to narrow the issues at stake in
proceedings. But these agencies do so by electing less ambitious solutions to
85
avoid decisions with more problematic practical consequences.

79. 42 U.S.C. § 74 10(a) (2006).
80. See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg.
at 44,485 (summarizing the challenges of regulating GHGs by setting NAAQS).
81. See Jonathan Miller, Comment, Double Absurdity: Regulating Greenhouse Gas Under the
Clean Air Act, 47 Hous. L. REV. 1389, 1404 (2011).
82. In a statement responding to one petition for a carbon dioxide NAAQS, EPA
explained that "[o] ur view has been that setting a [NAAQS] for greenhouse gases would not
be advisable and is not legally required." Activists Petition EPA for C02 NAAQS, Citing
Insufficient Climate Action, INSIDE EPA (Dec. 4, 2009), available at http://insideepa.com/InsideCal/EPA/Inside-Cal/EPA- 12/04/2009/activists-petition-epa-for-co2-naaqs-citinginsufficient-climate-action/menu-id-I 097.html.
83. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 29; Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond JudicialMinimalism, 43 TULSA
L. REV. 825 (2008) (exploring minimalism's limits); Jonathan T. Molot, PincipledMinimalism:
Restriking the Balance Between Judicial Minimalism and Neutral Principles, 90 VA. L. REV. 1753
(2004) (attempting to reconcile Bickel and Wechsler in a theory of "principled minimalism").
While Charles Sabel and William Simon have used the term "minimalism" to describe
administrative practice, they use it to refer to an approach to regulation that minimizes
agency discretion and incorporates market concepts and practices. See Charles F. Sabel &
William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. LJ. 53
(2011).
84. Cass Sunstein, Foreword:Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REV. 4, 14 (1996).
85. The parallel to an agency's quasi-judicial actions is most obvious. Like courts,
agencies may prefer to adjudicate narrowly rather than broadly and to leave deeply
contested questions undecided, especially when it is necessary to reach agreement on a
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Consider FWS's circumvention of listing decisions and critical habitat
designations under the ESA in the face of a hostile Republican Congress
after the 1994 mid-term elections. Led by Newt Gingrich, Congressional
Republicans espoused a deregulatory philosophy embodied in their
"Contract with America." 86 No regulatory scheme exemplified the kind of
governmental overreaching they despised better than the ESA, sometimes
called the "pitbull" of environmental laws because of its strict, clear
prohibitions on harassing or harming endangered species and on federal
actions that are likely to jeopardize a listed species or adversely modify the
87
species' critical habitat.
It was because of the ESA's uncompromising stance on harm to
endangered species, even where protections are extraordinarily costly, that
the incoming Republican majority sought to hobble the agencies tasked
with its implementation.8 8 To make matters worse, the outgoing Bush
Administration had entered into a litigation settlement with environmental
groups committing FWS to listing nearly 400 species over four years. 89 The
settlement put the agency in the position of having to exercise its authority
under the statute aggressively at a time when such action would further

multi-member commission. The logic of minimalism, however, extends to the agency's
quasi-legislative functions as well.
When agencies act in a quasi-legislative capacity,
reactions to controversial moves might subject them to reprisals from their political
principals or other actors. Thus, it can be to an administrator's advantage to avoid making
particularly controversial decisions where those choices are not essential to the resolution of
the problem before them.
86. See, e.g., Frank Swoboda, Plan Combines a Revival of Reaganomics, Reins on Regulation,
WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 1994, at A23.
87. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Who Needs Congress? An Agenda for Administrative Reform of the
EndangeredSpecies Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. LJ. 367, 384 (1998) ("Once a species becomes listed
and thereby protected, however, the [Endangered Species Act (ESA)] turns into the pitbull
of environmental laws."); Sandi B. Zellmer, Indian Lands as Critical Habitatfor Indian Nations
and EndangeredSpecies: Tribal Survival and Sovereignt Come First, 43 S.D. L. REv. 381, 394 (1998)
("The ESA [is] widely known as the 'pitbull' of environmental laws because of its broadsweeping application and stringent requirements .... ). For the ESA's prohibitions on
taking endangered species and on federal action that jeopardizes a species or its critical
habitat, see 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536, 1538 (2012).
88. The best known example of the ESA's protective power even in the face of
economic disruption is the story that led to the 1978 case TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
There, the discovery of a small endangered fish, the Snail Darter, halted, at least
temporarily, the completion of a large dam on the Tennessee River. For a compelling
version of the narrative by the attorney who brought the case, see ZYGMUNTJ.B. PLATER,
THE SNAIL DARTER AND THE DAM: How PORK-BARREL POLITICS ENDANGERED A LITTLE
FISH AND KILLED A RIVER (2013).

89. Timothy Noah, Caught in a Trap: Democrats Get Snared By GOP Pact on List ofEndangered
Species, WALL ST.J., Feb. 17, 1995, at Al.
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inflame the ESA's opponents. 90
Congressional Republicans indicated that they were serious about ESA
reform. First they imposed a moratorium on the listing of new species. 9 1
Several bills were subsequently introduced to amend the ESA.92 Despite
sympathetic-sounding titles, many of these bills would have effectively
gutted the statute. 93 Court decisions upholding capacious interpretations of
some of the ESA's toughest provisions added fuel to the critics' arguments.
In Babbitt v. Sweet Home, the Supreme Court upheld an interpretation by
FWS that "significant habitat modification or degradation that actually kills
or injures wildlife" constituted an impermissible "take" of a species under
the ESA. 94 Washington Senator Slade Gorton stated, in response to the
opinion, that "[n]ow, more than ever, it is critical that Congress reform the
' 95
act so that people are part of the equation.
To defuse the anti-ESA animus in Congress, the Department of Interior
took a series of actions designed to address concerns about the ESA's
costliness. Instead of enforcing the ESA against individual landowners in

90. According to Secretary Babbitt, the settlement "puto us in a reactive mode, always
working from a very tight comer that we've been painted into." Id.
91. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions for the Department of
Defense to Preserve and Enhance Military Readiness Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-6, 109
Stat. 73. President Clinton was forced to ratify this moratorium because it was included as
part of an omnibus defense spending bill.
92. A ranking official in the Department of the Interior's team at the time has referred
to "a D.C. sized phone bookH of anti-ESA bills that attacked the ESA from soup to nuts."
DonaldJ. Barry, Opportuniy in the Face ofDanger: The PragmaticDevelopment of HabitatConservation
Plans, 4 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. EN-vTL. L. & POL'Y 129, 132 (1998). A Fish and Wildlife
Service (FVS) news release explained that one of the bills, S. 851, would have established
"complicated and expensive procedures for compensating private landowners that appear to
have been devised simply to bring protection of endangered species on private land to a
grinding halt." Statement by Secretary Babbitt on the 'EndangeredSpecies Conservation and Management
Act
of
1995,
BUSINESS
WIRE,
Sept.
8,
1995,
available
at
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Statement+by+Secretary+Bruce+Babbitt+
on+the+Endangered+Species...-a017373331; see also Ruhl, supra note 87, at 369 (discussing
the "flurries of [ESA] bills introduced from all sides"). The Republican chairman of the
House Resources Committee, Representative Don Young (R-AK), promised to block
funding for ESA enforcement unless the Act's reach was curtailed. Bob Benenson, Panel
Chief Takes Aim at Endangered Species Act, MEMPHIS COMMERCIAL APPEAL (TN) (Jan. 15, 1995),
1995 WLNR 3200910.
93. See Craig Holt, Who's Really Endangered?, HERALD-SUN (Durham, NC), Feb. 4, 1996,
at Dll.
94. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687; 687, 708
(1995).
95. Robert T. Nelson & Eric Pryne, Ruling Seen Fueling Species-Act Fight, SEATTLE TIMES
(June 30, 1995), availableat http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?
date= 19950630&slug=2129064.
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California's San Joaquin valley, for example, the Department entered into
an agreement with California's Republican Governor, Pete Wilson, under
which the state would purchase water from farmers if needed to protect
species. Secretary Babbitt intended the deal to serve as "a demonstration
that the Endangered Species Act is workable and that it can play an
important role in finding a balance between economic and environmental
issues."96

In addition, he introduced "candidate conservation agreements." These
were formal, voluntary agreements for species that had been designated as
candidates for endangered or threatened status but whose candidacy had
not yet been evaluated. In lieu of considering their candidacy, the agency
entered into agreements with private property owners under which the
property owners agreed to take certain conservation actions in exchange for
a promise that FWS would not require additional conservation measures
even if the species were listed in the future. The goal of the agreements,
however, was to make eventual listing unnecessary. 97
Similarly, the Department entered into voluntary "habitat conservation
agreements" to avoid controversial critical habitat determinations. For
example, the California gnatcatcher, a small blue-grey songbird, was listed
as threatened in March 1993. However, the Department postponed a
decision about the bird's critical habitat, finding that habitat designation
was not prudent at that time. 98 Instead, the Department engaged in a
cooperative process with developers and conservationists designed to
provide protection for the gnatcatcher while allowing economic
development to go forward.9 9 By evading the ESA's strict habitat
designation provisions in favor of a more collaborative process, the
Department sought to avoid both legislative backlash and costly court
battles. 100

In this way, the Department deferred several listing and critical habitat
96. Deal Could Save EndangeredSpecies Act, SUN-SENTINEL (FL) (Dec. 18, 1994), availableat
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/ 1994-12-18/news/94121 70204_lspecies-actenvironmental-law.
97. Safe Harbor Agreements and Candidate Conservation Agreements, 62 Fed. Reg.
32,189, 32,190 (proposedJune 12, 1997) (noting that Candidate Conservation Agreements
(CCAs) "should be expected to preclude the need for listing species covered by the
Agreement as threatened or endangered under the Act").
98. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Special Rule To Allow
Take of the Threatened Coastal California Gnatcatcher, 58 Fed. Reg. 16,758, 16,758 (Mar.
30, 1993).
99. Id.; see also Keith Schneider, Accord is Reached to Aid Forest Bird, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16,
1993, at Al (quoting Secretary Babbitt explaining that his motive for the California
gnatcatcher plan and others like it was to protect the ESA).
100. Joan Hamilton, Babbitt's retreat, 79 SIERRA 52 (1994).

2014]

THEADMLNISTRATIVE STATE'S PASSIVE VIRTUES

decisions, which were a lightning rod for political opposition.' 0' As
Assistant Interior Secretary George Frampton, Jr. explained in 1995, "It is
not a secret that the Endangered Species Act is likely to be under great
stress in Congress over the next two years.
What the Clinton
administration is trying to do across the country is to demonstrate we can
02
make the Endangered Species Act work." 1
The strategy was successful. Representative Don Yong, chairman of the
House Natural Resources Committee and one of the main critics of the
ESA, noted in 1995 that he was "encouraged" by Secretary Babbitt's
moves and was waiting to see "how far the administration is willing to go
toward addressing all of the problems associated with the act.' 103 The
Department's minimalism held off congressional Republicans until the
04
elections of 1996, when more moderates were elected. 1
Although the Department's strategy has been criticized as insufficiently
aggressive, 105 it is clear that the primary motive was to preserve the ESA,
thereby ensuring the longer-term protection of endangered species. For
example, Secretary Babbitt defended his approach to managing the
California gnatcatcher's habitat in prudential terms, noting that the Pacific
Northwest had seen ten years of lawsuits and controversy over the
protection of endangered species. "We can't let that happen again," he
explained, "There's too much at stake in environment[al] terms and
06
economic terms." 1

101. Secretary Babbitt also used habitat conservation plans to manage state forests,
predicting that the approach would influence congressional Republicans not to gut the ESA.
See Babbitt PraisesLogging Plan, SEATrLE TIMES (Oct. 4, 1995), http://community.
seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19951004&slug=2145082
("Babbitt predicted
the approach will help persuade the Republican Congress to keep the Endangered Species
Act, which has come under fire for neglecting economic concerns while trying to ensure
species survival.").
102. New Clinton Plan Eases Restrictions on Loggers, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Feb. 8, 1995, at
A6.
103. Timothy Noah, Babbitt Proposes Reforms to Ease ConservationLaw, WALL ST.J., Mar. 7,
1995, at B6.
104. See James Gerstenzang, EnvironmentalistsSee Attacks by Foes Easing, L.A. TIMES,Jan. 2,
1997, at 14 ("'The House floor is clearly a more friendly place than during the last Congress,
by seven or eight votes at least,' said Greg Wetstone, legislative director of the Natural
Resources Defense Council."); see also Jessica Mathews, Earth First at the Polls, WASH. POSr,
Nov. 11, 1996, at A29.
105. As explained by one of the authors of the first Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP)
and the Department's "no surprises" policy, which guarantees private landowners governed
by an HCP that they will not be required to take more restrictive measures without their
consent, those policies, "in the views of many people in the environmental
community.., sort ofgive[] everything away." Barry, supra note 92, at 129.
106. Babbitt Reaffirms Gnatcatcher Protection Plan, L.A. TIMES (June 5, 1993),
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The Secretary's candor in describing the reasons for his minimalist
approach suggests a broader inquiry: why might agencies exercise the
passive virtues, and are those motivations justifiable in terms of statutory
goals? It is to these questions that the next sections turn.
II. WHY RESTRAINT?
A dominant narrative in the literature posits that agencies engage in
inaction and delay primarily for nefarious reasons, including lassitude and
narrow interest group influence. 107 Some cases of agency decisions not to
decide, step-by-step regulation, and administrative minimalism are
undoubtedly so motivated. But this unsympathetic account has crowded
out more positive, alternative explanations for agency restraint. Agencies
might also postpone decisions to avoid incurring the wrath of other political
actors, thereby avoiding backlash that could diminish their authority or
limit the impact of their actions going forward. Or they might avoid
particularly contentious issues to allow those issues to be resolved, in the
first instance, by a more democratically accountable actor.
Both of these are motivations that Bickel originally ascribed to the
courts, but there are good reasons to conclude that they drive
administrative deferrals as well. First, no less than other governmental
actors, agencies must be strategic. Indeed, agencies may have a greater
need for strategy than the three "traditional" branches of government
because their situation is less secure. Agencies have tenuous constitutional
roots and are dependent on their political masters for the authority they
exercise. Furthermore, like courts, agencies cannot claim legitimacy by
virtue of direct accountability to the electorate. These structural features
put agencies in a position where thinking strategically is a survival
mechanism. In order to carve out sufficient autonomous space to perform
their delegated functions, agencies must consider the practical
consequences of their actions. 108 Restraint is a helpful strategy in creating

http://articles.latimes.com/l1993-06-05/local/me-43613 _orange-county-forum.
107. Consider, for example, the statement ofJudge J. Skelly Wright in the Calvert Cliffs
case that "[o]ur duty, in short, is to see that important legislative purposes, heralded in the
halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal
bureaucracy." Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U. S. Atomic Energy Comm'n,
449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see also sources cited supra notes 5-7.
108. On the desire of agencies to create discretionary space, see Jennifer Nou, Ageny SelfInsulation Under PresidentialReview, 126 HARv. L. REv. 1755 (2013) (arguing that agencies
insulate themselves from presidential review by increasing the costs of that review). The
argument here does not depend on acceptance of agencies as fully autonomous actors,
although there have been gestures in that direction in the scholarly literature. Peter Strauss
has provided the strongest defense to date of agencies as independent organs of power in
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this space because it deflects scrutiny and criticism. By controlling the
timing and pace of regulation, agencies can move forward with their
agendas when they the likelihood of success is greatest.
A. Structural Considerations
Agencies are, like courts, "at least potentially a deviant institution in a
democratic society." 10 9 In some ways, the exercise of agency power
appears even more threatening than the judiciary's, given that the entirety
of administrative power derives, not from an explicit constitutional grant,
but from a flexible understanding of the Constitution's edicts. 110 That
document barely mentions administrative agencies, the only exceptions
being the references to "Departments" in the Necessary and Proper Clause
and in the Appointments and the Opinions Clauses of Article II."'
Certainly the framers could not have foreseen the scope of the modern
2
administrative state."
Another source of unease with administrative agencies is their lack of
direct accountability to the public. Agencies share this problem with
courts, although the concern is arguably less pronounced for agencies given
the presence of indirect accountability through the political branches.' '1
Nevertheless, the accountability deficit remains a threat to agency

government. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government.- Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573 (1984). Strauss adopted an understanding of the
constitutional structure as relying primarily on checks and balances between the branches to
prevent tyranny. Agencies, both independent and executive, fit into this structure as a
subordinate, but essentially separate, fourth branch. Id.at 578-79. In this way, Strauss
reconciled the idea of a large, quasi-independent bureaucracy with formal constitutional
structure.
109. BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 9, at 128.
110. Of course, while federal courts may trace their authority more generally to Article
III of the Constitution, the power of judicial review was less obviously envisioned by the
framers. See BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 9, at 1.
111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl.1-2.
112. For a more extended discussion of the limited constitutional treatment of agencies,
see Strauss, supra note 108, at 596-99.
113. As part of a recent symposium on Bickel, Sanford Levinson opined that "Bickel,
like too many of his legal academic colleagues, wildly over-estimated the 'democratic' nature
of the American political system in general when he claimed that judicial review presented
some 'special' difficulty." Sanford Levinson, Online Alexander Bickel Symposium: Alexander Bickel
Has Left the Building, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 20, 2012, 11:17 AM), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2012/08/online-alexander-bickel-symposium-alexander-bickel-has-left-the-building/.
While the lack of direct electoral accountability clearly poses special problems for courts,
Levinson is correct that the judiciary is not the only institution facing democratic deficit
concerns. As this section will discuss, administrative agencies, too, suffer from this affliction.
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legitimacy. 114
One result of the deficit is that agencies, like Bickelian courts, may
sometimes defer contentious decisions in the hopes that more accountable
actors will resolve the underlying questions, thereby obviating the need for
an administrative pronouncement. Bickel argued that the judicial role was
not to "resolve issues on which the political processes are in deadlock.""l 5
Rather, by demurring, courts could refocus the attention of opponents and
proponents back onto the legislature, "where the power of at least initial
116
decision properly belongs in our system ....,,
This "democracyforcing""l7 justification applies in the context of administrative agencies as
well. EPA's decision not to decide the question of whether GHGs could be
regulated under the CAA, for example, could be seen as an instance of
Bickelian democracy-forcing.
It was generally acknowledged that all
parties involved, EPA included, would have preferred that Congress amend
the CAA to make clear whether it covered GHGs and, if so, how they
should be regulated. The agency might therefore have delayed action in
the hope that Congress would legislate the problem out of existence.118

114. See, e.g, Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
2029, 2036 (2005) (describing agencies' democratic legitimacy problem and tracing the
history of the agency's efforts to compensate for it).
115. Bickel, Passive Virtues, supra note 9, at 60.

116.

Idat61.

117. On the practice of "democracy-forcing" approaches to statutory interpretation
more generally, see, for example, Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciay Is A They, Not An It
Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 550 (2005).
Cass Sunstein suggests that judicial minimalism can be democracy-forcing both by leaving
"issues open for democratic deliberation" and by ensuring "that certain important decisions
are made by democratically accountable actors." Sunstein, supra note 84, at 7.
118. The so-called "major questions" canon of judicial review may serve similar ends.
According to this doctrine, courts may be less inclined to defer to agency interpretations of
even ambiguous statutory provisions when the underlying issue is "a large question rather
than an interstitial one." Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 232
(2006) (citing a 1986 article by then-Judge Breyer suggesting that, when it comes to major
questions, courts should not defer to agency interpretations of law). Sunstein ultimately
concludes that "there is no justification for the conclusion that major questions should be
resolved by courts rather than agencies." Id. at 243. One of the reasons he offers is that,
under Chevron, less-accountable courts should defer to more-accountable agencies on
questions both large and small. Id. This logic, taken even further, would suggest that
agencies might be justified in deferring resolution of statutory ambiguities if they thought an
even more accountable actor (in this case Congress) was likely to resolve the issue. Abigail
Moncrieff has suggested that such a canon might be defended on the ground that agencies
should be precluded from weighing in on active legislative issues to avoid interfering "with
ongoing congressional bargaining." Abigail R. Moncrieff, Reincarnatingthe "Major Questions"

Exception to Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (Or Mhy Massachusetts v. EPA Got
It Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 593, 621 (2008).
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Another effect of the accountability deficit1 19 is that proxy mechanisms
have risen up to ensure that agencies cannot exercise unfettered discretion.
Threats come from multiple sources, the most significant of which are the
agency's political principals-Congress and the President-and the
judiciary. But agencies must also be conscious of reactions by other actors,
namely the states and the public, whose opposition might impede
regulatory efforts. 120 For at least the better-known federal agencies, each of
those audiences will form a judgment about an agency's actions, and that
view will shape their future interactions with the agency and its regulatory
12
programs. 1
Threats to agencies' continued viability are very real. Neither agencies,
nor the programs they administer, are immortal. David Lewis made the
remarkable finding that more than half of agencies created after 1946 were
terminated by 1997, with the risk of termination increasing after political
turnover in the White House. 122
Briefly, according to Lewis,
"administrative agencies never escape the politics that created them." 123
Of perhaps primary importance for agencies is that they do not
antagonize Congress, which wields formidable oversight power. By passing
new legislation, Congress can destroy an agency as surely as it can create
one. 124 But Congress has many tools available to hobble agencies short of
119. Political scientists Norton Long and John Rohr have made the argument that
agencies are actually more representative than the other branches of government because the
civil service better reflects the citizenry's makeup than either the Executive or Congress. See,
e.g., Norton E. Long, Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism, 46 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 808 (1953);
JOHN A. ROHR, To RUN A CONSTITUTION: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE (1986). No matter how well agency actors reflect the pluralistic makeup of society,
however, the fact remains that they are insulated from the public due to the absence of
direct electoral oversight.
120. One particularly evocative metaphor comes from Harold Bruff, who described
regulators as being bound up in complex "webs" with other governmental actors. See
Harold H. Bruff, PresidentialPower Meets BureaucraticExpertise, 12 U. PA.J. CONsT. L. 461, 465
(2010).
121. Daniel Carpenter has written extensively about the importance of reputation to
government agencies.
See, e.g., DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER:
ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 18 (2010)

(recognizing that other actors "also carry power, and they use it constantly").
122. David E. Lewis, The Politics of Agency Termination: Confronting the Myth of Agency
Immortality, 64J. POL. 89, 90 (2002). Lewis's data came from the United States Government
Manual, which lists all government agencies terminated since 1933. Id.
123. Id. at 92. A separate study, using a data set derived from the Catalog of Federal
Domestic Assistance, found that individual federal programs have a non-trivial likelihood of
mutation or death within their first ten years. Christopher R. Berry, Barry C. Burden &
William G. Howell, After Enactment. The Lives and Deaths of FederalPrograms, 54 AM.J. POL. SCI.
1,6(2010).
124. Of course, this process requires the signature of the President or a legislative
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outright abolishment. It controls agency behavior through decisions about
25
the procedures available to the agency under a given statutory scheme. 1
Policy disagreements between the agency and Congress tend to cause
126
legislators to reduce the amount of discretion afforded to the agency.
Congress also wields significant power as keeper of the purse. It may cut an
agency's budget, but it may also use the budget process to limit the agency's
discretion to undertake specific actions. For example, in July 2013, the
House Appropriations Committee approved a budget for EPA which not
only cut the agency's budget by over a third, but also contained policy
riders that would have prohibited spending on rulemaking which limited
27
carbon emissions from power plants. 1
Even when they do not form a majority in both houses, a majority party
in either house of Congress can still inconvenience or at least embarrass an
agency by delaying the confirmation of a political appointee or by calling
representatives from the agency to testify at congressional hearings. For
example, EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy endured a confirmation
process that lasted months and involved more than 1,000 questions about
EPA rulemaking procedures and agency transparency.128 Her nomination
was only confirmed after Majority Leader Harry Reid struck a deal with
members of the minority party in exchange for backing down on efforts to
limit use of the filibuster. 129 Committees may also issue time consuming
override of his veto.
125. Political scientists Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast, known
collectively by their nom de plume McNoilGast, have written extensively about Congress's use
of structure and process to control agencies. See Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3J.L. ECON. &ORG. 243 (1987) (investigating the
political control of agencies through oversight and procedural design); Mathew D.
McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the
Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431 (1989) (using the example of air pollution
regulation to elaborate on the use of process selection to control agency behavior). Jonathan
Macey has made similar observations. Jonathan R. Macey, OrganizationalDesign and Political
Control ofAdministrativeAgencies, 8J.L. EcON. & ORG. 93 (1992) (concluding that structure and
design are effective tools for political principals seeking to control agency behavior and to
reduce the ability of later political actors to manipulate that structure).

126. See Jason A. MacDonald & William W. Franko Jr., Bureaucratic Capaciy and
BureaucraticDiscretion: Does Congress Tie Policy Authoriy to Performance?, 35 AM. POL.
790, 791 (2007).
127.

STAFF OF H. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS,

RESEARCH

113TH CONG., A BILL MAKING

APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, ENVIRONMENT, AND RELATED

30, 2014, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
(Comm. Print 2013).
128. Richard Valdmanis & Valerie Volcovici, New EPA Chief Takes on Critics of US.
Agenc's Policies, REUTERS,July 30, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/assets/
print?aid=USBRE96T16620130730.
129. John M. Broder, AJer Delayed Vote, EPA. Gains a Tough Leader to Tackle Climate Change,
AGENCIES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER
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subpoenas to agencies, as the House Science, Space and Technology
Committee recently did when it requested that EPA provide data
underpinning key studies assessing the health effects of fine particulate
matter and ozone. The Committee also ordered Administrator McCarthy
to appear before them. 130
Second, to be successful in the long term agencies must preserve the
goodwill of the White House.1 31 Congress may be the creator of executive
agencies but the President is their political master. If they are to fulfill their
statutory mandates, agencies must survive the winds of political change.
New presidential administrations may have very different ideas from their
predecessors about the ideal composition of the federal bureaucracy,
especially if an agency is perceived as having "failed."' 132 During the 2008
presidential primaries, for example, Republican candidate Rick Perry
33
promised to abolish no fewer than three cabinet level agencies if elected. 1
N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/29/
us/politics/after-delayed-vote-epa-gains-a-tough-leader-to-tackle-cimatechange.html?pagewanted%3Dall&_r=0.
130. SeeJessica Coomes & Alan Kovski, House Science PanelIssues Subpoena Seeking EPA Data
Used to Justib Air Rules, BLOOMBERG BNA, Aug. 9, 2013, available at
http://news.bna.com/erln/ERLNWB/split-display.adp?fedfid=35452687&vname=ernotal
lissues&jd=a0e0f5r8y3&split=0.
131. The framework laid out here of necessity adopts an oversimplified version of the
pressures faced by any agency. One key qualification is that executive agencies often make
decisions in tandem with the White House. In such cases, it may be difficult to disentangle
purely political motivations from the good governance motivations that are the focus of this
Article. For example, it has been suggested, based on anonymous interviews with senior
agency officials, that the White House "systematically delayed enacting a series of rules on
the environment, worker safety and health care" to avoid controversy in the run-up to the
2012 presidential election. Juliet Eilperin, White House Delayed Enacting Rules Ahead of 2012
Election to Avoid Controversy, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2013), http://www.washington
post.com/poitics/white-house-delayed-enacting-rules-ahead-of-2012-election-to-avoidcontroversy/2013/ 12/14/7885a494-561a- 11e3-ba82-16ed03681809_story.html.
An administration might also he motivated to delay some agency regulations to allow others
a better chance of success. While the Obama Administration was focusing on costly
regulations from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) implementing the
Affordable Care Act, for example, it would have been a rational strategy to defer costly but
less time sensitive regulations from other agencies to avoid regulatory fatigue. An agency
that wishes to take a position contrary to the White House's position must consider the
practical consequences of disobedience. In the case of executive agencies, it may be that the
power the White House exercises over the agency is so great that the agency will almost
always accede to White House preferences. The calculus, however, is still Bickelian.
132. Lewis cautions that even "[t]he termination of agencies ostensibly to improve
economy and efficiency or remedy administrative failure" may have political overtones.
Lewis, supra note 122, at 91.
133. Elspeth Reeve, Rick Perry Can't Remember Which Agency He Wants Abolished, ATLNTic
WIRE, Nov. 9, 2011, http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2011 /11 /watch-rick-perry-
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These are not empty threats. Agencies that were created by unilateral
executive action, a set that includes more than half of the administrative
agencies created since the end of World War 11,134 may be abolished by
presidential fiat. Presidents may also reorganize agencies and manipulate
budgets to encourage cooperation. 135 And where an Act of Congress is
required to eliminate or reorganize an agency, the President may propose
legislation to Congress and use his political influence to encourage passage.
Presidents also have the power, in the case of executive agencies, to remove
political appointees who fail to adhere to White House policy

preferences. 136
Furthermore, presidents exercise significant oversight over agencies via
the review of major rulemakings by the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), situated within the President's Office of
OIRA was established in 1980 by the
Management and Budget.
Paperwork Reduction Act. 137 Beginning with Ronald Reagan in 1981,
presidents have controlled and shaped OIRA's authority and duties by
executive order. 138 Although originally created to oversee government
information collection requests and to ensure that they were not too
burdensome, one of OIRA's primary tasks has become the prepromulgation review of significant government regulations. 3 9 In addition,
forget-which-agency-he-wants-abolished/44788/.
134. William G. Howell & David E. Lewis, Agencies by PresidentialDesign, 64J. POL. 1095,
1096 (2002). Examples of agencies created by the President acting alone or by his political
appointees include the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Peace Corps. Id. at 1097. Agencies created
through Presidential reorganization plans, which took effect unless Congress took action on
them within a specified time, include the EPA and the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare. Id.
135. Id. at 1095-96.
136. For example, President Nixon demanded the resignations of Attorney General
Elliot Richardson and his Deputy Attorney General, William Ruckelshaus, because they
refused to fire Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox. Finally, acting Attorney General Robert
Bork dismissed Cox. Carroll Kilpatrick, Kzxon Forces Firingof Cox; Richardson, Ruckelshaus Quit,
WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1973, at Al.
137. 44 U.S.C. § 3503 (2006).
138. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982) (Ronald Reagan); Exec.
Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994) (William Clinton); Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3
C.F.R. 191 (2008) (revoked 2009) (George W. Bush); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215
(2012) (Barack Obama).
139. A "significant" regulatory action is defined as one that may, among other criteria,
have an effect on the economy of $100 million or more or raise novel legal or policy issues.
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. §§ 638, 640-41 (1994). Some have criticized the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for its role in the rulemaking process, suggesting
that the role itself, or the way particular administrations have exploited that role,
unconstitutionally interferes with congressional prerogatives. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig,
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an increasing number of executive orders instruct agencies in everything
from how to conduct cost-benefit analyses on proposed rules to how to
consider the impact of regulation on small businesses. 14 Agencies ignore
these executive orders at their peril. 141
Agencies also seek to avoid judicial entanglements. Court battles are
expensive, and reversals are even more so.
The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) estimated that the cost of defending EPA
against lawsuits was about $5.38 million per year from 2008-2010.142 This
figure does not include the considerable expense of reformulating a rule on
remand. The agency's reputation with the courts may affect the outcome
of lawsuits. An agency that places a premium on deliberateness and
consistency, for example, is more likely to garner deference for its
interpretations than an agency whose decisions are more impetuous and
43
less thoroughly reasoned. 1

The Bush Administration's Use and Abuse of Rulemaking Part I: The Rise of OIRA, 28 ADMIN. &
REG. L. NEWS 8 (2003); Morton Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential
Control of Ageng Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MIcH. L. REV. 193 (1981).

Despite these outliers, and despite some initial uncertainty, today OIRA's legitimacy is
largely accepted. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatoy State, 62
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 15 (1995) (noting that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
review of government regulations "has become a permanent part of the institutional design
of American government").
140. See, e.g., Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies on Regulatory Flexibility, Small Business, and Job Creation, 3
C.F.R. § 328 (2012); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012) (Barack Obama)
(outlining the administration's preferred approach to cost-benefit analysis).
141. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminai, Inquiy
into Agency Statutoy Interpretation,57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 506 (2005) ("Agency recalcitrance in
the face of a valid executive order is neither politically prudent nor constitutionally
appropriate."). As a general matter, these orders are directed only to executive agencies
rather than independent agencies, with the exception of the requirement that agencies
submit a Regulatory Agenda and Plan. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. §§ 638, 640-42
(1994). Former OIRA Administrator Sally Katzen is of the view that the President has a
legal basis to review decisions from independent regulatory commissions as well, but chooses
not to do so out of deference to Congress. Sally Katzen, OIRA at Thirty: Reflections and
Recommendations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 103, 109 (2011) (recommending that review be extended
to independent agencies' regulations).
142. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFIcE, GAO-1 1-650, ENVIRONMENTAL
LITIGATION: CASES AGAINST EPA AND ASSOCIATED COSTS OVER TIME 19-22 (2011).
These costs were borne by the Department ofJustice, the U.S. Treasury, and the EPA itself.

Id.
143. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (citing Skidmore v.
Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944) ("The fair measure of deference to an agency
administering its own statute has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts
have looked to the degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative
expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency's position ... ")); see also JAMES M.
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FERC was clearly concerned with crafting a rule that would survive
judicial scrutiny when it issued Order 888, even if that meant deferring
resolution of some questions to another day. The phrase FERC used in
Order 888 to describe its motives for restraint, "difficult jurisdictional
issues,"' 144 suggests that it was concerned about the practical consequences
of deciding too much too quickly. Faced with jurisdictional "hard
questions," where presumably the risks of error are increased (or which at
least present a situation where reasonable minds, even reasonable judicial
minds, might differ), it was vital for FERC to consider the cost of defending
its interpretation against legal challenges and the costs of possible reversal
and remand.
With the states, too, federal agencies must preserve goodwill and avoid
rancor. The relationship is perhaps one of natural hostility, since the
expansion of the federal bureaucracy has largely been at the expense of
state power. Areas that were traditionally subject to state regulatory or
common law authority such as public utilities, food safety, and clean water
are now at least partly governed by federal agencies. This dynamic creates
a potentially combustible relationship between federal and state regulators.
For that reason, cooperation, where achievable, in many cases provides the
45
most constructive path forward. 1
With respect to the public, although they need not face voters at the
polls, agencies still benefit from public cooperation. Public unhappiness
with regulatory programs can, if pronounced enough, make an agency's
day-to-day tasks much more difficult by reducing a regulation's
effectiveness, increasing litigation costs, reducing the information available
to the agency, 146 limiting cooperation with endeavors such as negotiated
LANDIS, THE ALMINISTRATIWE PROCESS 144 (1938) ("A reputation for fairness and
thoroughness that attaches to a particular agency seeps through to the judges and affects
them in their treatment of its decisions.").
144. Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,577.
145. For a discussion of cooperative federal and state regimes in environmental law, see
Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism:Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L.
REV. 1141 (1995); Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14
N.Y.U. ENwL. LJ. 179 (2005) (expanding the discussion of cooperative federalism in
environmental law from pollution control to natural resources).
146. Agencies depend on the public for much of the information they need to do their
jobs. Sometimes information requests are mandatory, such as when regulatory violations
More often, however,
are suggested and an enforcement action is contemplated.
information collection relies on public cooperation. Information is collected either through
the standard Administrative Procedure Act (APA) notice and comment process on proposed
regulations or through more explicit Requests for Information. For example, in developing
energy efficiency measures for commercial products, the Department of Energy actively
seeks public comment and feedback. The Department concluded in a recent Request for
Information on residential and commercial water heaters published in the Federal Register
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rulemaking, or making enforcement more expensive. 147 Public backlash
can also have second-order effects by triggering media scrutiny and
sparking congressional reaction. 48 For all of these reasons, agencies must
consider carefully the possible effects of any decision on its relationships
with stakeholders.
B. Restraint as Strategy
Certainly, in some cases agencies might best avoid unnecessary
confrontation by taking action to appease a political principal or other
actor. But avoiding decisions partially (as in the case of step-by-step
regulation or administrative minimalism) or fully (as in the case of decisions
not to decide) has several clear advantages for agencies wishing to deflect
potential ire.
First, postponing a decision is less likely to attract attention than making
one. And even other actors who are following an issue closely may be more
sympathetic to deferrals than to outright denials, knowing that they still
have a chance to influence the ultimate decision. An agency can thus use
inaction strategically to buy time to build support, bolster its decision with
better information, or prepare to respond to attacks.
As Cass Sunstein has suggested with respect to judicial minimalism,
more visible issues are likely to attract more attention to agencies and
exacerbate any negative consequences of a decision. 149 Where issues are
particularly divisive, therefore, as in the case of climate change, agencies
may gain more from playing the long game than from acting aggressively.

that "DOE considers public participation to be a very important part of the process" of
developing standards and test procedures. Energy Conservation Program: Test Procedures
for Residential Water Heaters and Commercial Water Heaters; Request for Information, 78
Fed. Reg. 2340, 2346 (Jan. 11, 2013).
147. Stakeholder cooperation is also key to the success of agency enforcement programs.
Due to limited resources, agencies simply do not have the ability to detect all or even most
violations. They are therefore dependent on tips and self-reports. FERC, for example,
"strongly encourages companies to submit self-reports of possible violations."
FERC,
Enforcement, Self Reports, http://www.ferc.gov/enforcement/self-reports.asp (last accessed
Monday, Jan. 21, 2013). Other agencies with self-reporting or self-disclosure programs
include the Securities and Exchange Commission, HHS, and EPA. These programs result
in the identification and correction of more internal violations than the agencies could
discover and correct on their own.
148. For example, Daniel Carpenter explains that Food and Drug Administration's
(FDA's) leaders "worry about how a medical study or a new report by one of the agency's
watchdogs will generate embarrassment, legislative and scientific scrutiny, emboldened
challenges from the agency's subjects, and perhaps reduced authority." CARPENTER, supra
note 121, at 18.
149. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 29, at 59.
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We might be less concerned about the democratic implications of agency
restraint where an issue has high visibility, since it is more likely that
dialogue will continue in the absence of a decision by the agency.
In periods of divided government, or where the agency's own mission is
not embraced by the White House or by Congress, restraint might also be
prudent. Under such circumstances, agencies may wish to conserve their
resources rather than fight battles they cannot win. FWS's minimalist
approach to ESA enforcement might be seen in this light.
Agencies may also find it useful to be more restrained after a period of
protracted rulemaking to avoid regulatory fatigue.15 0 Financial institutions
in the European Union, for example, have repeatedly complained of an
overload of regulations following the issuance of the Financial Services
Action Plan.151 There have been similar complaints in the United States
about rulemakings under the Dodd-Frank financial industry reform
legislation, especially from smaller banks. 152 To avoid a backlash from the
regulated community that might lead to legislative adjustment of agency
authority, therefore, a more deliberate pace of rulemaking going forward
might be indicated.
New agencies that do not yet have widespread support might have an
incentive to be particularly cautious. The Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau is one such agency. Opposition to its creation as part of the DoddFrank Act in 2010 was intense, and it has been a target of Republican
opposition since its inception. 153 Given this political climate, Adam Levitin
has queried whether the agency's interests would be best served by taking a
stand or by "compromising and living to fight another day." 154
Deferrals can also open up a middle way for agencies that find
themselves with a menu of unappealing substantive options. It may be

150. Some commentators have argued that we are experiencing regulatory fatigue more
generally, and that in response we have shifted from command-and-control models of
regulation to government-stakeholder network structures and economic incentive systems.

See Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Centuy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437,
446 (2003).
151.

See Duncan Alford, The Lamfalussy Process and EU Bank Regulation: Another Step on the

Road to Pan-EuropeanRegulation?, 25 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 389 (2006).
152. See Ben Goad, Are Community Banks Too Small to Survive Dodd-Frank Rules?, THE HILL
(July 18, 2013), http://thehill.com/regulation/finance/3 12165-are-community-banks-toosmall-to-survive-dodd-frank-rules- (quoting testimony before Congress from the president of

a small bank in Florida who complained of regulatory fatigue).
153. See Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer FinancialProtection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 ANN.
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 365 (2013).

154. Id. at 369 ("The [Consumer Financial Protection Bureau] CFPB is a powerful new
agency, but it is also one very much aware of its vulnerability and likely to proceed carefully
and soberly in the face of its political situation.").
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better for an agency not to decide than to choose between a conclusion
supported by the weight of available data, but that would entail negative
practical repercussions, and one that is more prudent but runs counter to
the evidence. The latter would be unlikely to survive judicial review and
would earn the agency a reputation for inaccuracy. The former might
ultimately be self-defeating.
The State Department found itself in such a situation recently with
respect to the military overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi in Egypt.
When asked by a reporter from the Associated Press whether the
administration had taken a position on whether the overthrow should be
designated a "coup," the spokesperson for the State Department responded
that, "We have determined that we do not need to make a
determination."1 55 If the Department were to find that a military coup had
taken place, it would be required by law to suspend aid to Egypt under the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.156 But a finding that no coup occurred
would likely be viewed with skepticism given the military's clear
involvement in the ouster of a sitting president. 157 It might also encourage
the armed forces of other nations to undertake similar overthrows of elected
leaders. As a former chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee put
it, "The law by its terms dictates one thing, and sensible policy dictates that
we don't do that."158 The Department therefore chose a prudent middle
ground: it decided not to decide.
Deferring questions or deciding them in minimalist ways also has
practical advantages over making a choice then having to backtrack at a
later date. This is because deferral eliminates the transaction costs of
changing course. In their work on investment theory, Avinash Dixit and
155.

State Department Spokesperson Jen Psaki is Interviewed on CNN, CQ-ROLLCALL POL.

TRANSCRIPTIONS (Aug. 15, 2013).
156. Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act requires that the United States cut aid to
any country "whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d'&at or
decree." This language was somewhat modified in the 2011 omnibus appropriations bill for
the Department, which provided that assistance may be resumed once a democratically
elected government has taken office and that the aid cutoff does not apply to funds to
promote democratic elections or participation in a democratic process. S. 1601, 112th
Cong. § 7008 (2011) (enacted).
157. See Max Fisher, US. Has Spotty Record on Law Requiring it to Cut Aid After Coups, WASH.
POST (July 5, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp
/2013/07/05/u-s-has-spotty-record-on-law-requiring-it-to-cut-aid-after-coups/
(" [] here is
little doubt that this met the definition of a coup against a democratically elected
government.").
158. Peter Baker, A Coup? Or Something Else? $1.5 Billion in US. Aid Is on the Line, N.Y.
TIMES,July 5, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/05/world/middle
east/egypts-arrests-of-islamists-pose-test-to-us-over-military-aid.html
?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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Robert Pindyck propose that, all else equal, as the costs of reversing a
59
decision increase, actors will enter into those decisions more carefully.1
As the costs of regulatory action and the risk of error increase, therefore, we
would expect agencies to become more cautious about decisionmaking,
especially under conditions of uncertainty.1 60 Moreover, to the extent that
rulemaking has indeed "ossified" as a result of procedural constraints,
reversal of agency decisions has become increasingly costly.161 The courts
permit agencies to change course provided agencies acknowledge the
change and provide good reasons for the new policy. 162 But rulemaking is
resource intensive, and agencies might find it more prudent to defer a
judgment in the first instance than to go through the process twice. 163
Preservation of authority through restraint is a viable strategy for
agencies because, like courts, agencies have longer time horizons than
political branches do. Congressional time horizons are notoriously short,
especially for the House of Representatives, with many scholars suggesting

159. AvINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY
(1994).
160. Some suggested, for example, that EPA might not have been interested in putting
in the time and effort required to revise a regional air pollution rule yet again after the first
two versions were invalidated by the D.C. Circuit. See North Carolina v. EPA, 550 F.3d
1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (remanding Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) to EPA but not
vacating the rule); EME Homer City Generation v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(invalidating Cross-State Air Pollution Rule but leaving CAIR in place). Fortunately for
EPA, the Supreme Court recently reversed the D.C. Circuit and upheld the Cross-State Air
Pollution Rule. See EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014).
161. See Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE LJ. 1463, 1470 (1992)
(coining the term ossification to describe the encrustation of the rulemaking process with
formal requirements); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossifr Agency Rulemaking, 47
ADMIN L. REV. 59 (1995) (providing the seminal discussion of the phenomenon); see also
Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical
Examination of Federal Regulatoy Volume and Speed, 1950-1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414,
1418-19 nn.16-24 (2012) (collecting sources). Note that the ossification thesis has recently
been called into question. Yackee and Yackee, for example, claim to have disproved
ossification empirically. Id. at 1419 n. 25. Of primary importance here, however, is simply
that any additional procedural constraints imposed on an agency that wishes to change a
preexisting policy will make strategic restraint more appealing. See, e.g., Paralyzed Veterans
of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that amendments to
definitive interpretive rules must go through notice-and-comment rulemaking).
162. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009). The Court held
that agencies need not provide "detailed justification[s]" for every change or show that "the
reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one." Id.
163. It may also be easier to reach agreement on deferrals than on denials. Agreement
is especially important on multi member commissions, where no decision can be taken
without a majority of commissioners signing on. For the judicial analogue, see Cass R.
Sunstein, Incompletely TheorizedAgreements, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1733, 1758-59 (1995).
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that legislators think no further than the next election. 164 Presidents, too,
think in terms of what they can accomplish in the space of a single term or,
at a maximum, over two terms in office. But while agency political
appointees might be focused on what can be accomplished during their
tenure, the vast majority of agency employees hold their positions over the
longer term. Like federal judges, they have job security and salary
protections.165 Also like federal judges, they are less focused on short-term
success than are elected officials.
There is also ample evidence from the political science literature that
these career bureaucrats have public-spirited motives and a sense of
mission. 166 For most agency employees the tasks before them are part of
broader programmatic responsibilities, and success is measured over longer
time frames than is the case for the political branches. EPA employees
might thus think of their mission as, for example, reducing air pollution, or
keeping water bodies usable, or, more generally, minimizing environmental
harm. There is additional evidence that civil service members self-select
67
into agencies whose mission they share.
Even political appointees may have longer-term visions than their
legislative and executive counterparts. A recent study of administrative
appointees suggested that their political preferences were not necessarily
aligned with either the incumbent President or with Congress. 168 Instead,
the study found that most agencies were more liberal than both the President
and the median in both chambers of Congress, with the exception of
traditionally conservative agencies such as the military. 169 This research
strongly suggests that agencies are more independent in their preferences
than a presidential control model would suggest. Agency heads also clearly
164. See, e.g., CONGRESS RECONSIDERED (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer,
eds., 7th ed. 2000) (emphasizing the importance of reelection for members of Congress);
DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (2d ed. 2004).
165. See Brendan Koerner, What Are Civil Service Protections?, SLATE.COM (July 29, 2002),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/explainer/2002/07/what are-civil_
service_protections.html.
166. The term used most frequently to describe this phenomenon is "public service
motivation," or PSM, which posits that public servants have public-serving motivations that
distinguish them from workers in the private sector. See, e.g., James L. Perry & Lois
Recascino Wise, The Motivational Bases of Public Service, 50 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 367 (1990)
(examining the nature of PSM and ways to stimulate it); Bradley E. Wright, Public Service and
Motivation: Does Mission Matter?, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 54 (2007) (suggesting that public sector
employees' sense of mission increases employee work motivation).
167. See, e.g., Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Poli
Discretion, and BureaucraticExpertise, 51 AM.J. POL. Sci. 873 (2007).
168. Joshua D. Clinton et al., Separated Powers in the United States: The Ideology ofAgencies,
Presidents, and Congress, 56 AM.J. POL. Sci. 341 (2012).
169. Id. at 352.
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take pride in the accomplishments of their agencies over time. In her first
address as EPA Administrator, Gina McCarthy expressed her
understanding of the continuity of the agency's mission by referring to CAA
successes since 1970, noting that aggregate emissions of common air
pollutants have dropped sixty-eight percent, and that between 1970 and
1990 programs under the CAA helped prevent more than 205,000
170
premature deaths.
For another example of this longer-term viewpoint, consider FERC's
step-by-step approach to asserting jurisdiction in electricity markets. Like
Chief Justice- Marshall in Marbuy v. Madison, FERC in Order 888
accomplished the twin goals of reserving the right to regulate more
aggressively later while avoiding the costly confrontations with states that
would undoubtedly have ensued had it asserted jurisdiction more forcefully
in Order 888 itself.171 Crucially, while FERC acknowledged in Order 888
"the very legitimate concerns of state regulatory authorities" in choosing if
and when to "unbundle a" retail sales from transmission, 172 it was careful to
preserve the possibility that it would claim jurisdiction over the transmission
3
The Commission warned states
component of retail sales at a later date. 17
that it would respect state objectives only insofar as those objectives did not
"balkanize interstate transmission of power or conflict with our interstate
open access policies."' 174 Just as Marbury did for judicial power, Order 888
carved out a broad sphere of federal administrative jurisdiction but left the
more detailed delineation of that sphere to another day.
FERC's approach may have resulted in less immediate progress in terms
of improving the competitiveness of electricity markets, but it made the
policy's long term success more viable by avoiding naked confrontations
with state regulators, who are understandably highly sensitive to any
expansion of FERC's role. Order 888 was already a bold incursion by
federal regulators into areas traditionally regulated by state and local
authorities. For this reason, it was more prudent for FERC to consolidate
its new position requiring wholesale unbundling and to allow states to

170. McCarthy, supra note 68. Political appointees may also be drawn from the ranks of
the federal or state civil service, in which case they are even more likely to be motivated by a
sense of agency mission. Examples of this type of appointee include Stephen Johnson,
appointed by President George W. Bush as EPA Administrator after a twenty-seven-year
career with the agency.

171.

See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (disclaiming original mandamus

jurisdiction but asserting the far more aggressive power ofjudicial review).
172. Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,542.
173. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 25 (2002) ("FERC chose not to assert such
jurisdiction, but it did not hold itself powerless to claim jurisdiction.").
174. Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,542.
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continue to regulate bundled retail service. One commentator has even
suggested that "difficult jurisdictional issues," the reason FERC gave for its
demurral in Order 888, might be "a euphemism for an uprising of state
75
public service commissions." 1
Two unpalatable consequences might flow from alienating FERC's statelevel counterparts. First, the cooperation of state regulators is essential to
the conduct of FERC's day-to-day business. Second, antagonizing state
regulators might lead them to seek a congressional solution to their
concerns about statutory overreaching. Indeed, even given FERC's
restraint, after the Supreme Court ruling, some states still intimated that
they might lobby Congress to amend the FPA to protect state jurisdiction,
and sources implied that conversations with staffers were already
underway. 176
But the National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners (NARUC), which represents state regulatory bodies,
ultimately decided not to push for a statutory amendment.177 Had FERC
gone further in Order 888, however, NARUC might as well have thrown
its support behind a legislative solution.
FERC lost little by choosing not to regulate bundled retail transmission
in Order 888. It saved itself the expense and headache of an even more
divisive jurisdictional battle while preserving its option to regulate retail
transmission at a later date. 178 It asserted sufficient jurisdiction to
accomplish its immediate goals but avoided antagonizing the state
regulators whose cooperation is essential to the long term success of the
79
agency's mission. 1

175. Christian Schmollinger, FERC's Powers Grow in Wake of Court Decision, NATURAL GAS
WEEK, Mar. 11, 2002.
176. Backing Open-Access Rule, High Court Beckons FERC Into Retail Arena, Too, ELECTRIC
UTILITY WEEK, Mar. 11, 2002 [hereinafter Backing Open-Access Rule]. FERC may have
been particularly anxious not to antagonize state regulators since it wanted to keep them "on
board" with its developing regional transmission program. See Schmollinger, supra note 175.
177. Backing Open-Access Rule, supra note 176.
178. Id.
179. An additional benefit of leaving options open here was that it allowed state and
local regulators to take the first crack at the problem of ensuring fair prices and
nondiscrimination in the retail transmission markets. If the state and local regulators
succeeded, FERC would have saved itself the trouble of a federally imposed, top-down
solution. If they failed, FERC could always step in. Finally, FERC may have calculated
that, were it to become obvious at some later date that undue discrimination plagued the
retail transmission markets as well as the wholesale markets, it would face less political
opposition in asserting jurisdiction there as well.
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C. EvaluatingAgency Restraint
The previous sections explained why agencies, like courts, must be
strategic in the exercise of their authority and the utility of restraint as a
strategic tool. This section provides a normative evaluation of restraint. It
argues that strategic restraint can be reconciled with our basic
understandings of how a "good" agency behaves. One conception of a
"good" agency is an obedient agency. This approach understands agencies
as strictly bound by the will of the enacting legislature and emphasizes the
importance of an agency's faithfulness to statutory commands. Another
approach understands agencies as bound, not by external forces, but by the
requirement that their decisions be based on neutral, technocratic
expertise. The purpose here is not to express a preference for either frame
but to posit that administrative restraint can be consistent with both.
1. Faithfulness
Perhaps the earliest version of the faithful agency theory was the
"transmission belt" model identified by Richard Stewart.180 According to
this understanding, an agency's role is to put discrete statutory mandates
into practice. It should exercise minimal discretion, leaving all major
questions to Congress. Because agencies were meant to be automatons
rather than autonomous actors, a strategic agency would be a dangerous
agency.
However, as Stewart recognized, the "conveyor belt" frame gave way
early on to more nuanced understandings of what it means to be a faithful
agent. Congress simply cannot legislate specifically enough to allow
administrative agencies to implement its instructions without exercising
discretion. Consider, for example, the limited role played today by the
nondelegation doctrine, which requires Congress to provide agencies with
an "intelligible principle" that agencies may follow, ostensibly limiting their
discretion. 181 The last time that the Supreme Court struck down a statute
as conferring excessive discretion on administrative agencies was during the
New Deal. 182 Courts have created further space for agency discretion in
implementing statutes by deferring to reasonable agency interpretations of
180. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV.
1667, 1675(1975).
181. For an argument that the nondelegation doctrine is not dead but has instead been
transformed into a series of "nondelegation canons," see Cass Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons,
67 U. CHi. L. REv. 315 (2000).
182. See A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking
down portions of the National Industrial Recovery Act as conferring legislative authority on
the Executive Branch); see also Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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statutes they are tasked with administering, whether or not the Court would
reach a similar interpretation. 183 In sum, many delegations to agencies are
84
capacious and most leave room for interpretation. 1
Today, therefore, the idea of a faithful administrative agency must be
more nuanced.18 5 The best indicator of Congressional intent is the
legislation itself. Thus, a faithful agency is one that takes legislative goals
and instructions as its guiding principles. Agencies must be faithful to the
will of the enacting Congress as embodied in a piece of legislation unless
and until a sitting Congress modifies those views by amending the
legislation or enacting new legislation.
Strategic restraint is consistent with this more capacious understanding
of bureaucratic actors as faithful agents. Where Congress speaks in
mandatory terms and with sufficient specificity, agencies might not have
room for flexibility. The CAA, for example, requires that EPA review and
revise the NAAQS every five years. 186 But statutory grants of authority are
often capacious, and where the specifics are not dictated by statute,

183. See Chevron, U. S. A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
184. The Supreme Court recognized this fact of modem life in Mistretta v. United States,
where it noted that "our jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in
our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems,
Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general
directives." 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
185. The idea of faithful agency is not without its complications. As Jerry Mashaw has
explained, faithful agency is complicated by agencies' "political milieu"-in particular, by
their relationship with the President. See Mashaw, supra note 141. See also Jerry Mashaw, As
If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE LJ. 1685, 1692 (1988) (declaring that the "faithful agency
idea can never be much more than a starting point for interpretation"). Mashaw opines that
where text is not clear, even the most faithful of agents must use their own creativity to
imagine what Congress would have meant, assuming that they were behaving as if they were
a good republican legislature. Id.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d) (2006). Of course, even when Congress has issued specific
directives, agencies may still have trouble meeting deadlines. EPA, for example, has
repeatedly missed deadlines for five-year review of the NAAQS. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund v.
Thomas, 870 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that EPA had missed the deadline for
reviewing and revising the NAAQS for sulfur dioxide); Am. Lung Ass'n v. Browner, 884 F.
Supp. 345 (D. Ariz. 1994) (finding that EPA had missed the deadline for reviewing and
revising the NAAQS for particulate matter); Cmtys. for a Better Env't v. EPA, No. C 0703678JSW, 2008 WL 1994898 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (finding that EPA had missed the deadline
for reviewing and revising the NAAQS for carbon monoxide). Delays like these that are the
result of inadequate agency resources, while they might be justifiable on other grounds,
would not be consistent with the idea of faithful agency under the theory put forward here.
For more on justifying agency inaction and delay based on resource constraints, see Eric
Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN L. REV. 1 (2008) and
Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: JudicialReview ofAdministrative Agency Action and Inaction,
26 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 461 (2008).
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agencies must exercise discretion over whether, when, and how to act.
Strategic restraint, therefore, takes place comfortably inside. textual
boundaries in most instances.
Even where the statutory text seems to suggest the need for more
aggressive action than the agency believes is wise, the agency might still
invoke interpretive canons to control the pacing and nature of its
decisionmaking. This is especially true where the problem before the
agency is not one that Congress considered when it enacted the relevant
legislation. Where there is a choice between blind adherence to statutory
instructions that would produce absurd results and more restrained
implementation of statutory schemes that an agency believes would better
fulfill the goals and purposes of the enacting Congress, a truly faithful agent
will pursue the latter rather than the former. 187 This kind of faithful agent
will use the powers delegated to it strategically to achieve the goals set by
88
Congress, even if this counsels restraint in some cases. 1
2. Expertise
Another school of thought holds that agencies are prevented from
exercising unbridled discretion by the requirement that their
decisionmaking be guided by technocratic expertise. This idea has its roots
in the New Deal philosophy of James Landis. Landis argued that
administration was scientific, that the public interest was objectively
discernible, and that the obligation to make decisions based on data and
89
expertise, therefore, limited administrative discretion. 1
One version of the expertise argument might hold that agencies should
go wherever their technocratic inquiry takes them, and that pragmatic
considerations should be inadmissible at every stage of the decisionmaking
process. By this logic, agencies cannot avoid a decision for strategic reasons
if the evidence dictates an outcome one way or another.
But this ignores the predicate step in every agency decision, which is
whether to investigate the matter in the first place. At this earlier decisional
187. Mashaw presents a slightly different version of this argument when he accepts the
idea of a constitutionally "sensitive" faithful agent, by which he means an agency that
interprets statutes in the "overall context of the legal order." Mashaw, supra note 141, at
508. This Article argues for something similar, with the difference being that agencies
should be sensitive, not only to constitutional principles, but to context and practical
consequence, when following statutory commands.
188. Further complicating this picture is the fact that agencies must be faithful to
multiple legislative goals at once. Congress can legislate piecemeal, delegating diverse
responsibilities to a single agency without suffering at the polls. Strategic deferrals can be
useful techniques for coordinating these responsibilities.
189. See Kagan, supra note 5, at 2261.
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stage, a different kind of expertise comes into play. While agencies may be
primarily technocratic experts, they also possess what might be called
practical or contextual expertise. This is another way of saying that
agencies are experts in understanding the practical pressures of their
political environment. They are in the best position to predict the likely
consequences of making a decision.
This practical expertise is what enables agencies to exercise their subject
matter expertise effectively. Consider what would have happened if, for
example, FERC had made an expert decision that unbundling of retail
transmission from electricity sales was necessary to keep electricity rates just
and reasonable, and that it had the jurisdiction to do so. There might have
been marginal gains in competitiveness in electricity markets. But those
State public utility
gains would have come at significant cost.
less
willing
to
enter
into
collaborations with
commissioners might have been
FERC in the future. An aggressive approach by the federal agency might
thus have precluded the highly successful Smart Response Collaborative,
which focuses on demand response and smart grid issues, as well as the new
"Sunday Morning Collaborative," which provides federal and state
commissioners with the opportunity to work through issues from regional
governance structures to transmission siting. 190
In essence, then, faithfulness to expertise, like faithfulness to statutory
text, still leaves room for flexibility and might even require flexibility in some
cases. 191 The difficulty is to find the right balance between checking undue
agency discretion and allowing agencies the flexibility to do their jobs. The
argument here is that strategic restraint helps to maintain that balance
rather than subverting it. Decisions not to decide, regulating step-by-step,
and taking minimalist actions can create more space for agencies to pursue
192
faithful, expert implementation of statutory schemes.

190. See Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs (NARUC), Smart Response
Collaborative (last visited July 23, 2014), www.naruc.org/Policy/FERC/?c=3; see also Press
Release, NARUC, FERC, NARUC Revamp 'Sunday Morning Collaborative' (Jan. 25,
2013), available at www.naruc.org/News/default.cfm?pr=348&pdf=.
191. Some administrative flexibility is essential because rigid systems tend to collapse.
For a non-legal example, consider the Golden Gate Bridge. A masterpiece of engineering,
the bridge has stood since 1937 between the San Francisco Bay and the Pacific Ocean,
buffeted regularly by strong winds. The bridge can only survive those winds because its
enormous suspension cables can bend up to twenty-seven feet from side to side without
damage. Thus, in heavy winds, the bridge sways rather than snaps. John Bernard
McGloin, Symphonies in Steel: Bay Bridge and the Golden Gate, VIRTUAL MUSEUM OF THE CITY
of
San
Francisco),
(Museum
of
the
City
OF
SAN
FRANcIsco
http://www.sfmuseum.org/hist9/
mcgloin.html.
192. This defense of restraint as a tool for preserving expertise has parallels to Bickel's
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As suggested below, considering pragmatic factors only at the "whether,
when and how much" stage of the decisionmaking process would actually
help maintain the expert character of the agency's substantive decisions.
Merits decisions can remain "technocratic, statutory, or scientifically
driven," 193 and agencies may thus continue to serve as bastions of neutral
expertise. To some extent, therefore, bifurcation addresses the concerns
that Jody Freeman and Adrian Vermeule proposed were behind the
Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. 194 Freeman and Vermeule
suggested that the decision represented "[e]xpertise-forcing,

. .

. the attempt

by courts to ensure that agencies exercise expert judgment free from outside
political pressures."' 195 But even a court that is concemed about the
influence of politics on technocratic decisions might concede that practical
concerns can play a role in agency decisionmaking so long as they are
isolated from merits decisions.
We place weighty demands on government agencies. We ask them to be
obedient. We ask them to follow the letter of the law. We ask them to go
where the evidence takes them. But we also ask agencies to administer
regulatory schemes successfully. These seemingly irreconcilable demands
can only be squared if some flexibility, including the opportunity for
restraint, is built into the administrative process. And yet, as this section
has sought to demonstrate, agency restraint need not be inconsistent with a
conception of agencies as faithful agents nor as neutral experts.

argument about the relationship between principle and pragmatism in the courts.
According to one view, the courts are only legitimate institutions to the extent that their
decisionmaking adheres to principle, which might be seen as the analogue to administrative
technocratic expertise. See Herbert Wechsler, TowardNeutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73
HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959). But, Bickel argued, unyielding adherence to principle is selfdefeating in practice.
A Supreme Court that required immediate, aggressive
implementation of Brown v. Board of Education, Bickel suggested, might have faced massive
revolts, administrative impossibility, and widespread disobedience. The Court would have
remained faithful to principle but failed to achieve its aims and suffered a blow to its
legitimacy in the process when its edicts went unenforced. By recognizing the practical
limitations before them and choosing to implement the decision more deliberately, Bickel
argued, the courts preserved their own political capital while ensuring longer-term
compliance with their principled decision in Brown. BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH,

supra note 9, at 244-72.
193. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposinga Placefor Politics in Arbitraty and Capricious Review, 119
YALE LJ. 2, 5 (2009) (describing the standard understanding of what arbitrary and
capricious review requires).
194. SeeJody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise,
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51 (2007).

195. Id.at 52.
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III. COMING TO TERMS WITH THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE'S PASSIVE VIRTUES

A theory of the administrative state's passive virtues has implications
both for administrative process and for doctrines of judicial review. This
Part will first turn to the question of which factors agencies might
legitimately consider in deciding whether, when, and how much to decide.
It then suggests that permissible prudential considerations should come into
play only at this earlier stage, a bifurcation of decisionmaking that preserves
the technocratic character of what we might call "merits" decisionsdecisions on the substantive question at issue.
This Part also suggests how decisions not to decide might be
"domesticated"-driven from the shadows and accommodated within the
framework of administrative law-without opening the door to abuse. One
tool to avoid potential abuse is transparency, which has the added benefit of
preserving the dialogic function of the passive virtues, even where final
agency action is postponed. But transparency, to be a successful remedy,
must be linked to a more deferential standard of review for agency
restraint. Any framework for review must acknowledge the legitimate role
played by considerations of relationship management that may counsel
restraint while still providing a check on so-called "nefarious" influences
such as shirking, self-aggrandizement, and narrow interest-group influence.
To that end, this Part offers some preliminary ideas about how restraint
might be accommodated within arbitrary and capricious review of agency
action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
A.

Bifurcated Decisionmaking

A crucial question for agencies, and for courts, is which factors count as
permissible and which do not. The touchstone here is whether the
consideration is in service to the agency's statutory goals. Thus, concerns
about the reactions of other actors and the effect of those actions on longerterm implementation of a statutory scheme would be permissible. Pure
laziness on the part of bureaucrats (shirking), an individual agency official's
desire for personal advancement (self-aggrandizement), or the desire to
cater to a one particular interest group would not.
There are parallels here to the argument put forward by Kathryn Watts,
Nina Mendelson, and others that consideration of political preferences, as
expressed by the President, need not render agency decisions "arbitrary
and capricious." 196 Like Watts's and Mendelson's proposals, the case for
196. Watts, supra note 193; Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing "Political" Oversight of Agency
Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2010) (proposing that the nature of White House
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administrative restraint would expand the range of factors that an agency
could properly consider. However, there are several key distinctions. First,
a theory of administrative restraint would permit agencies to look beyond
White House influence to the influence exercised by other actors in the
system. Second, a theory of administrative restraint does not turn on the
cause of interference by other actors. The President may wish to postpone
resolution of an issue because he believes he has a democratic mandate to
do so or because of a promise he made to a campaign donor. Watts rejects
the legitimacy of the latter influence, which she calls "raw politics or
partisan politics."' 197 From the agency's perspective, however, the crucial
point is simply that disobedience might be detrimental to the agency's own
longer-term policymaking efforts-the reason is less salient. It might be
prudent, in the situation described, to postpone a decision until the
President cares less about the issue or until the agency has built other
support sufficient to counter the President's influence. 198
Finally, while Watts and Mendelson focus their arguments on the stage
at which an agency makes a substantive decision, the approach put forward
here would confine pragmatic considerations to an earlier stage in the
process. Agencies could properly consider the practical consequences of a
decision when deciding whether and how much to decide, but those
concerns should be absent when a decision is finally taken. In other words,
pragmatic considerations should not be built into the "merits" phase of
administrative decisionmaking. 199
One advantage of displacement is procedural. Isolation makes it more
likely that deliberation on the substantive question will be free from the
influence of more contextual, practical considerations, including politics.
Within the agency, we would expect to see decisions at each stage
spearheaded by a different group of actors. Political appointees and highinfluence on agency rules be disclosed). But seeJodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American
Administrative Law: Power, Rationaliy, and Reasons, 61 DUKE LJ. 1811 (2012) (rejecting a model

of political reason-giving).
197. Watts, supra note 193, at 9.
198. A closer parallel is to the idea put forward, though not elaborated, in Cass R.
Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction AJer Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 672
(1985) (suggesting that agencies may choose not to act based, in part, on "the reaction of the
public and of relevant officials in Congress and the executive branch" and that the Court
must consider all of these factors in deciding whether the agency has acted arbitrarily).
199. Of course, Congress may have made certain choices for the agency in its
authorizing legislation, as in § 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, which specified the criteria upon
which any judgment by the Administrator must be based. 42 U.S.C. § 752 1(a) (2006 &
Supp. IV 2011). However, this observation merely transfers the question of how and when
prudential factors should be considered to the legislature. In most cases, the legislature
should reinforce the bifurcated decisional scheme suggested here.

2014]

THEADMINISTRATIVE STATE'S PASSIVE VIRTuES

level officials would play a greater role in the decision about whether, when,
and how much to decide, whereas the substantive decisions would be made
primarily by the agency's expert staff, who are typically civil service
appointees.
Substantively, displacement makes it less likely that we will see merits
decisions that run contrary to the evidence before the agency or that
otherwise run afoul of the APA. Of course, much of the criticism currently
leveled at merits decisions may be redirected at the prudential stage.
However, as discussed below, broadening the standard of review at this
stage will help to mitigate the potential increase in litigation.
B. Reviewing Restraint
Because agency decisions not to decide, step-by-step regulation, and
administrative minimalism might all be motivated by prudentialism that is
consistent with the relevant statute and aims to preserve, rather than to
undermine, expertise, it is right that review of agency restraint be
deferential. In most cases, the courts have rightly resisted calls to police
agency restraint more aggressively, although they have not articulated some
of the strongest grounds for that deference, namely, the need for agencies to
consider prudential factors in choosing how and when to act. 200 Here,
Massachusetts v. EPA is a significant outlier, suggesting, as it did, that
prudential concerns had no place in agency decisionmaking. 2 1 This
section suggests that the reasoning of Massachusetts v. EPA on this point
should be abandoned. Instead, courts should apply the more capacious
understanding of the relevant factors an agency may properly consider
articulated in a more recent decision, Judulang v. Holder.20 2 Finally, this
section addresses the limits of the passive virtues.
1.

CurrentReview Frameworks

Although some statutes contain citizen suit provisions authorizing
citizens to commence civil actions where an agency has failed to perform a
statutorily mandated act or duty, 203 much agency restraint is reviewed

200. See, e.g., Justice Harlan's concurrence in American Commercial Lines, where he noted
that he did not "doubt that an administrative agency may, where the orderly processes of
adjudication or rulemaking require, defer the resolution of issues to more appropriate
proceedings." Am. Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 392 U.S.
571, 594-95 (1968) (Harlan,J., concurring).
201. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534-35 (2007).
202. Judulangv. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011).
203. See, e.g., the citizen suit provision in the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2)
(2006) (providing that any citizen "may commence a civil action on his own
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under the APA. The APA treats restraint differently depending on the
species of inaction or delay at issue. Some failures to act are presumptively
unreviewable. This is so where the statute either precludes judicial review
or where decisions are "committed to agency discretion by law. ' 20 4 Courts
have found that actions are so committed when the statute provides "no
law to apply" or where background understandings delineate areas of
presumptive agency discretion. 205 These background understandings
include the idea that agencies have broad discretion to decide whether to
initiate enforcement actions, whether to grant reconsideration of an action
because of material error, whether to terminate an employee in the interests
of national security, and how to allocate funds from lump-sum
appropriations.

206

Where there is law to apply, but an agency has delayed or withheld
action and has not documented its decision to do so, the relevant standard
of review is the one articulated in 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), which states that courts
may compel agency action that has been "unlawfully withheld" or
"unreasonably delayed." 20 7 Allegations of unreasonable delay are governed
by the so called TRAC factors, a test created by the D.C. Circuit. 208 By
examining earlier cases, the court discerned "the hexagonal contours of a
standard" governing when a delay was so egregious as to warrant
mandamus. 209

behalf.., against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to
perform any act or duty under this [Act] which is not discretionary with the Administrator").
The citizen suit provision in the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (2006), is similar.
204. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)(2012).
205. See, e.g Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 592, 600 (1988) (finding dismissal of a
Central Intelligence Agency employee unreviewable where standard announced in statute
"fairly exudes deference to the Director"); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985)
(holding that FDA's decision not to investigate possible statutory or regulatory violations and
not to take enforcement action was presumptively unreviewable).
206. See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993) (enumerating cases).
207. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012).
208. Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. (TRAC) v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 72 (D.C. Cir.
1984). The TRAC case grew out of claims by several public interest groups that the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) had unreasonably delayed a determination of whether
AT&T was required to reimburse ratepayers after allegedly overcharging them.
209. Id. at 80. The six factors are: "(1) the time agencies take to make [the] decision[]"
(governed by a "rule of reason"); (2) a congressionally mandated timetable or other
indication of congressional intent with respect to the pace of implementation of a statutory
scheme; (3) whether the interests at stake involve human health and welfare, in which case
delay is less reasonable than if the consequences are purely economic; (4) the effects of
compelling agency action on other agency priorities; (5) the "nature and extent of the
interests prejudiced by delay;" and (6) any impropriety or "agency lassitude," although this
finding is not required in order to determine that unreasonable delay has occurred. Id.
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More formal decisions not to decide, such as denials of rulemaking
petitions, as well as step-by-step and minimalist decisions, are reviewed
under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), which states that agency actions may be set aside
in six circumstances. 210 This review often boils down to whether the
agency's decision is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
21 1
otherwise not in accordance with law."

These distinctions make sense. A court cannot assess whether an agency
considered relevant factors or made a clear error ofjudgment in doing so if
the agency has not explained which factors were considered. Thus, unless
we are prepared to require agencies to create a record in all cases in which
they fail to act, including in enforcement cases, the multitrack review is
inevitable. Lisa Bressman would impose a reason-giving requirement on all
agency inaction, including non-enforcement decisions. 212 But while such
an approach has merit in principle, it would likely be prohibitively
expensive in practice. 2 13

Even if the reason-giving requirement were

limited to cases in which a specific action had affirmatively been sought by
an actor outside the agency, the demands on the agency's time would still
be overwhelming, especially if petitions increased as a result of the
intervention, exacerbating the already significant problem of insufficient
administrative resources.
210. That section states that a reviewing court shall:
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (D) without
observance of procedure required by law; (E) unsupported by substantial evidence in
a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record
of an agency hearing provided by statute; or (F)unwarranted by the facts to the extent
that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012).
211. Id. § 706(2)(A).
212. Bressman, supra note 6, at 1693. Bressman acknowledges the time and expense that
would attend implementation of her proposal, but concludes that "these costs are
unavoidable if the goal is agency legitimacy." Id.
213. EPA, for example, receives citizen petitions seeking agency action in a number of
different programmatic areas. Since 2007, EPA has received sixteen petitions seeking
regulation under § 21 of the Toxic Substances Control Act. Section 21 Petitions Filed with EPA
Since September 2007, EPA, http://wwv.epa.gov/opptintr/chemtest/pubs/peitions.html (last
updated July 16, 2014). The agency has also received seven rulemaking petitions under
§ 553(e) of the APA since January 1, 2013. The agency does not make petitions received
prior to that date available. Petitionsfor Rulemaking, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/
aboutepa/petitions-rulemaking (last updated Mar. 16, 2014). These numbers are in
addition to petitions for enforcement actions and petitions for reconsideration, which are not
included on the EPA website but which a keyword search on regulations.gov, the federal
government's regulatory clearinghouse, revealed to be numerous.
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Courts reviewing agency restraint in the form of failure to take an
enforcement action or of pure delay therefore assume a deferential posture
out of necessity. The alternative justification for agency restraint set
forward here provides additional support for this deference. And yet, even
though similar justifications for deference exist where restraint is reviewed
under the arbitrary and capricious standard, this standard is less forgiving.
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court took a narrow view of what
factors an agency may consider when deciding not to decide. Because this
more restrictive reading risks inhibiting needed agency flexibility as well as
directing restraint into channels, like delay, that inhibit transparency, a
reevaluation of the standard is called for.
2. Expanding ArbitrarinessReview
Of the three standards of review described above, it is the arbitrary and
capricious framework that needs the greatest modification to accommodate
an agency's prudential decision to defer decisionmaking. This section
214
therefore proposes a place for pragmatism in arbitrariness review.
Crucially, this review takes place before an agency has made its substantive,
or "merits," decision. It is the question of "whether, when and how
much"-the decision not to decide, the step-by-step approach, or the
minimalist approach-that is the subject of the arbitrariness review.
As applied to administrative restraint, the arbitrariness framework
should be thought of as a Chevron-like inquiry. In the first instance, a court
should ask whether failure to make a decision in the particular case violates
specific statutory language. This step recognizes that the question of what
factors the agency may consider rests ultimately in legislative hands. If the
agency's choice is not a clear violation of the statute, however, the court
should move on to the familiar arbitrariness inquiry: did the agency
consider the relevant factors in deciding to defer a decision, and did its
215
conclusion represent a clear error ofjudgment?
At the second stage of the inquiry, the court should align its perspective
with the agency's. In other words, it should appreciate that agencies must
consider not only the impact of making a decision on the question before
them but also on their programmatic agenda more broadly and on the
success of their programs over time. 216 Here, courts should follow the logic

214. This phrase is a nod to the tide ofKathryn Watts's piece. See Watts, supra note 193.
215. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)
(articulating this test for the first time); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v.
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (developing the test).
216. Jerry Mashaw has made the point that agencies must consider context because they
have some responsibility to ensure the coherent development of the legal order. See
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ofJudulang v. Holder, a recent Supreme Court case involving the appeal of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision ordering the deportation of
an alien. 217 Judulang, a lawful permanent resident, pled guilty to voluntary
manslaughter in 1988 and was subsequently placed into deportation
proceedings after he pled guilty to another crime in 2005. To determine
whetherJudulang was eligible for discretionary relief from deportation, the
immigration judge and then the BIA compared his crimes to a list of
offenses eligible for relief in a different class of cases (called the "comparable
grounds" approach). Judulang argued that this method was "arbitrary and
capricious" under the APA.218
A unanimous Supreme Court agreed. It applied the State Farm!Overton
Park test, asking whether the BIA's decision was "based on a consideration
of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of
judgment." 219 The BIA, the Court found, "flunked that test" because its
comparison approach was "irrelevant to the alien's fitness to reside in this
country."220 But instead of adopting Massachusetts v. EPA's restrictive
understanding of "relevant factors" as limited to statutory factors, the
Judulang court noted that relevant factors the agency might properly have
considered included those "tied, even if loosely, to the purposes of the
immigration laws or the appropriate operation of the immigration
system." 22 1 Because the BIA's policy did not meet even this deferential
standard, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's denial of relief tojudulang
and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The Judulang approach allows agencies flexibility to consider the
pragmatic consequences of a decision.
While State Farm held that
"relevant" factors are ones that Congress intended the agency to consider,
we should not be so quick to assume that Congress intended agencies to be
technocratic automatons.
Given the breadth of at least some of its
delegations, it seems more likely, or at least as likely, that Congress intended
agencies to be pragmatic in the exercise of their delegated authority.
This more practical approach to evaluating agency restraint under the
arbitrary and capricious framework suggests a different outcome in
Massachusetts v. EPA. Applying the Judulang framework, the Court should

Mashaw, supra note 141, at 510 ("[A]gencies must balance their more remote responsibilities
as contributors to the unity of the legal order, and hence to the operational feasibility of the
rule of law, with their more proximate and primary responsibilities to the development of
one segment of it.").
217. Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011).
218 Id.

219. Id. at484.
220.
221.

Id.
Id. at 485.
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have deferred to EPA's consideration of the practical consequences of
forming a judgment about whether GHGs endangered public health and
welfare. As Justice Scalia pointed out, § 202 of the CAA "says nothing at all
about the reasons for which the Administrator may defer making a
judgment-the permissible reasons for deciding not to grapple with the
issue at the present time." 222 This reading of the text, which EPA endorsed,

was reasonable. The Court should therefore have deferred to the agency's
interpretation.

223

A further argument for deference is that agencies are far better
positioned than courts to engage in this kind of broader balancing. As the
Court noted in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, it is for agencies,

2 24
and not courts, to decide how to achieve broad, programmatic goals.

Where discretion exists, therefore, it is for agencies to decide how to
exercise it in a way that furthers overarching statutory objectives. Agencies
are better qualified than generalist courts to predict other actors' reactions
to a decision, as well as the consequences of those reactions for both the
individual question before the agency as well as the agency's broader
agenda.225

The Judulang approach also better harmonizes with the Court's holdings
in earlier cases and in related administrative law doctrines. In an earlier
case that bears marked similarities to Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court came
out the other way on the question of an agency's discretion not to make a

222. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 552 (2007) (Scalia,J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 552-53. It is possible, of course, that the Court could have adopted a more
capacious understanding of what counts as a "relevant factor" and still concluded that the
factors EPA considered were inadmissible. For example, it might have found that while an
agency is expert in domestic policy dynamics, it lacks the knowledge required to make
judgments about foreign policy. Thus, EPA's explanation that it was concerned about the
effects of unilateral GHG regulation on international negotiations might have been
unpersuasive. See id. at 498. Such a holding would have had the advantage of being less
restrictive of agency flexibility.
224. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 67 (2004) (declining to
require agencies to take specific actions to preserve wilderness areas and noting that "[t]he
prospect of pervasive oversight by federal courts over the manner and pace of agency
compliance with such congressional directives is not contemplated by the APA").
225. Whether or not agencies may consider goals articulated elsewhere in the U.S. Code
is a closer question. As the Court held in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. The LTV Corp., 496
U.S. 633 (1990), it might be problematic to require agencies to consider public policies not
articulated in their own enabling act. And yet, this case says nothing about permitting
agencies to do so. In Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Committee v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir.
1987), the D.C. Circuit addressed this second question.
It opined that it might be
permissible for the Secretary of Transportation to consider factors outside of those identified
in the relevant statute, but that the Secretary should explain her decision to do so and how
those goals were consistent with the ones in the statute. Id. at 854.
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judgment in the first instance. In Young v. Communi4y Nutrition Institute, the
Court deferred to FDA's interpretation of a statute as giving it discretion to
decide whether to promulgate tolerance levels for a naturally occurring
carcinogen, aflatoxin, found in some foods.226 More generally, the Court
has granted increasing deference to agencies on questions of statutory
interpretation. Under the doctrine of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, courts will defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a
statute it is tasked with administering. 2 7 In City of Arlington v. FCC, the
Court clarified that Chevron applied even where the relevant statutory
228
provision concerned the scope of the agency's own authority.
In light of Community Nutrition Institute, decided two years after Chevron, as
well as CiGy ofArlington and Judulang, it may be best to see Massachusetts v. EPA
as an aberration. It may have been the majority's specific interest in
forcing action on climate change that led it to take an imprudently narrow
view of the agency's discretion. Or, asJody Freeman and Adrian Vermeule
have suggested, the majority opinion may have been the product of a trend
of disenchantment with political influence on agency discretion. 229 Either
way, the relevant holding is proof of Justice Holmes's statement that
"[g]reat cases like hard cases make bad law.., because of some accident of
immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts
230
the judgment."
C. The Limits of the Passive Virtues
It is important to acknowledge that prudential considerations play a role
in agency decisionmaking, and it is sensible for courts to defer to judgments
based on those considerations. However, care must be taken not to allow
restraint to become a shield for malfeasance. Therefore, courts and other
actors can and should still take seriously their responsibility to police agency
decisionmaking for the presence of nefarious motivations.
231
Prudence, as Bickel emphasized, is not a synonym for arbitrariness.
226. 476 U.S. 974 (1986). Justice Stevens, the author of the majority opinion in
Massachusetts v. EPA, dissented in roung. Stevens would have found the statutory provision at
issue unambiguously required the FDA to set tolerance levels for aflatoxin. Id. at 984-88
(Stevens,J., dissenting).
227. Chevron, U. S. A., Inc. v. Natural. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
228. City ofArlington addressed the question of whether, under the rubric of Chevron, FCC
had the authority to interpret a provision of the Federal Communications Act requiring that
state and local government act on wireless facility siting applications within a "reasonable
period of time." City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
229. Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 194, at 54.

230.

N. Secs. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197,400 (1904) (Holmes,J., dissenting).

231.

Others writing about discretion have taken the argument one step further,
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Threshold determinations about whether and when a decision should be
made can be guided by reason even if they are not principled in the sense
we have come to associate with Wechslerian generality and neutrality. 232
In his article on the authority of the courts to decline the exercise of
jurisdiction that has been granted, David Shapiro makes a similar
argument-that "discretion need not mean incoherence, indeterminacy, or
caprice." 233 Shapiro suggests that discretion might be cabined either by
background principles of law or by the body to whom discretion was
delegated. 234

With respect to administrative discretion, expanding the permissible
range of factors for agency consideration does not alter the basic premise
that agencies must exercise their discretion deliberately.
Allowing
prudential concerns to emerge from the shadows does not grant agencies a
roving license to make arbitrary decisions. Agency actors must continue to
justify their decisions, either in the first instance for decisions required to be
made on the record or, for other decisions, when challenged, with reasoned
explanations according to the strictures of the APA. The difference under
the proposed regime is simply that those explanations may include broader
prudential concerns without risking reversal.
Emphasizing judicial deference where a statute confers broad discretion
on an agency would not reduce a judge's role to a mere "charade. ' 235 Two
supervisory models might describe the court's role vis-t-vis administrative
agencies: preventive and policing. Jody Freeman and Adrian Vermeule
explain that one thing the Massachusetts v. EPA court might have been trying
2 36
to do was to promote the former (they call it a "prophylactic principle.").
But prophylactics risk stifling benign as well as malignant behavior, and the

providing principles by which discretionary decisions can be given structure even while
allowing room for prudential considerations. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985) (coupling his defense of courts' discretion in the
exercise of their own jurisdiction with suggested principles to govern that discretion).
232. Bickel, Passive Virtues, supra note 9, at 51 (distinguishing prudence from 'judgment
proceeding from impulse, hunch, sentiment, predilection, inarticulable and unreasoned").
233. Shapiro, supra note 231, at 545.
234. Id. at 547 (arguing that jurisdictional grants to courts are best understood as also
delegating the power to choose the criteria that will be applied in making decisions and that
the common law tradition helps limit these choices).
235. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68-69 (1976) (Leventhal,J., concurring). In Ethyl,
the issue was the proper standard of review for an agency decision that implicated highly
technical questions. Judge Leventhal was responding to the suggestion in Judge Bazelon's
concurring opinion that courts should leave matters of technical complexity to the agency's
discretion. Id. Despite the difference in contexts, however, the fear of unbridled agency
discretion is comparable.
236. Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 194, at 87.

2014]

THEADMICISTRATIVE STATE's PASSIVE VIRTUES

realities of agency decisionmaking militate in favor of a policing model that
limits affirmative malfeasance while permitting discretion within statutory
bounds. This type of review would be designed to identify any "corrosive
237
influences" on the agency.
For an example of how this type of review might work, consider the
inquiry into agency delay. A reviewing court might slightly rework the
sixth TRAC factor to emphasize the importance of malfeasance to a finding
of unreasonable delay. The sixth factor currently states that "the court
need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to
hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed. ' 238 Deemphasizing the
sixth factor downplays the importance of finding unreasonable delay if
malfeasance is suggested. But as the D.C. Circuit has held, "[i]f the court
determines that the agency [has] delay[ed] in bad faith, it should conclude
that the delay is unreasonable."23 9 Similarly, courts should find agency
action arbitrary and capricious where plaintiffs provide actual evidence of
improper influences on an agency's decisionmaking process. For example,
allegations that an agency's professional staff had come under pressure to
alter scientific data, if supported, would lead to grave doubts about the
240
propriety of the agency's choice.
Greater candor from agencies would make this review more meaningful.
It is almost a clich6 today to quote Justice Brandeis's exhortation that
"sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants." 241 As suggested above,
agencies can and do weigh prudential considerations in deciding whether,
when, and how to act. It is important that our regulatory processes
acknowledge this and provide avenues for disclosure of such considerations.
By encouraging agencies to be more forthcoming about the practical
realities that inform their decisionmaking, we can craft more effective
critiques of the process and more effective standards for review of agency

237. The term comes from Bressman, supra note 6, at 1661. For an example of how this
review might operate in practice, consider the D.C. Circuit's careful scrutiny of EPA's
reasoning in Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (scrutinizing the record
"to assure that nothing unlawful or irrational has taken place").
238. TRAC v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quotations omitted).
239. See Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 879, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also In re Monroe
Commc'ns Corp., 840 F.2d 942, 946-47 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (retaining jurisdiction over a case
because of allegations that the FCC had acted in bad faith).
240. See, e.g., Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 194, at 54-64 (discussing alleged White
House pressure on EPA to alter reports on climate change).
241. Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER'S WEEKLY, Dec. 20, 1913, at 10.
The full quotation is as follows: "Publicity is justly recommended as a remedy for social and
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most
efficient policeman." Id. A search for the phrase quoted in the text showed that it had been
cited, in full, in no fewer than 138 law review articles and journals.
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decisions. 242 While exorcising nefarious influences completely from the
administrative process may not be possible, if agencies are more
forthcoming about the factors that persuaded them to decide not to decide,
we can be more sanguine that true motivations are not being hidden, and
courts can evaluate the full scope of reasons on the merits.
If the agency is exercising prudence by limiting the scope of a final rule,
either in terms of jurisdiction or substance, the requirement of reasongiving already applies. 243
Agencies might also consider adopting
procedural rules requiring greater candor when they deny rulemaking
petitions, elect to tackle problems in case-by-case adjudications as opposed
to general rulemakings, or simply delay action. While the Vermont Yankee
decision limits courts' ability to require procedures that go beyond those
contained in the APA and an agency's organic statute, 244 agencies
themselves are free to adopt regulations to require more transparent
reason-giving.
EPA's denial of a petition to regulate lead emissions from general
aviation aircraft piston engines demonstrates the desirable level of candor.
In the denial, the EPA stressed the regulatory actions it was already taking
to deal with lead pollution, including revising NAAQS for lead, improving
the nation's lead monitoring network, and limiting emissions of lead under
its program for hazardous air pollutants. 245 These programs, EPA
explained, had required "considerable time and resources to
accomplish." 246 Thus, EPA emphasized its efforts to coordinate agency
programs to reduce lead and explained why the regulation petitioners
sought was not essential to achieve the necessary reductions. If courts were
more deferential to prudential explanations, EPA might also have noted the
problem of regulatory fatigue in its denial or the polarizing nature of GHG
regulation and the resulting need to focus on the most effective and least

242. Transparency has the added benefit of ensuring that the exercise of the passive
virtues does not, as Margaret Gilhooley put it, "stall the consensus building process."
Margaret Gilhooley, Tobacco Unregulated: My the FDA Failed,and What To Do Now, 111 YALE
LJ. 1179, 1200 (2002). In other words, debate about the proper resolution of a problem can
continue even if the agency defers action.
243. See Short, supra note 196, at 1817-18 (discussing the APA's requirement of reasongiving for formal rulemaking and adjudications and the evolution of a comparable judgemade requirement for informal rulemaking).
244. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519 (1978) (holding that the APA sets a ceiling on procedural requirements that a court
may require an agency to adopt for informal rulemaking).
245. Memorandum from EPA in Response to Petition Regarding Lead Emissions From
General Aviation Aircraft Piston-Engines 11-13 (July 18, 2012), availableat http://www.
epa.gov/otaq/regs/nonroad/aviation/ltr-response-av-ld-petition.pdf.
246. Id. at 14.
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disruptive regulations first.
Additional tools for disclosure include the Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPRM), which is often used to signal the early stages of a
rulemaking process. An ANPRM is especially useful where a proposed rule
247
will likely elicit an especially strong reaction from citizens or other actors.
The advance notice and invitation to participate in the formulation of the
rule through submission of comments and/or participation in public
hearings may lessen some of the hostility to the rule by giving parties time
to come to terms with its requirements and by making sure they feel their
voices have been heard. To make prudential considerations more
transparent, ANPRMs might include, and ask commenters to consider,
factors such as the likely reactions of other governmental and nongovernmental actors.
In delay cases, instead of merely delaying its responses to a rulemaking
petition, an agency might post regular status updates on the petition or
request and the reasons that no response has yet issued. One way that this
could be done is in the agency's Regulatory Agenda and Regulatory Plan,
which must be submitted to OIRA annually or semiannually under
Executive Order 12866.248 The Order includes minimal requirements for
each document, which must be submitted by all agencies, including
independent agencies. 249 The Regulatory Agenda must contain "all
regulations under development or review" as well as "a brief summary of
the action, the legal authority for the action, [and] any legal deadline for
the action." 250 Regulatory Plans need only include the most significant
actions an agency plans to undertake that year, but they require a more
detailed analysis of those actions, including how they relate to the
President's priorities, how the risk addressed by the action relates to other
risks within the agency's jurisdiction, and the agency's schedule for
action. 25' All agency Agendas and Plans are compiled into a publicly252
available Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions.
247. Regulation of GHGs is certainly one example of such a rule. Another is
rulemaking concerned with the provision of contraceptives to women under the Affordable
Care Act. HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius issued an advanced notice of proposed
rulemaking on this issue, and specifically on the question of how to ensure women's access to
preventive care while respecting religious liberty, in March 2012. Certain Preventive
Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501 (Mar. 21, 2012).
248. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, at § 4 (b)-(c), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
249. In Executive Order 13,579, President Obama exhorted independent agencies to
comply with the directives set forth in Executive Order 13,563 "[t]o the extent permitted by
law." Exec. Order No. 13,579, 3 C.F.R. 256 (2012).
250. Exec. Order No. 12,866, at § 4(b), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993).
251. Id. at § 4(c).
252. For the current Agenda, see Current Regulatory Plan and the Unified Agenda of Regulatog
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By executive order, the President could expand the reporting obligations
in these documents to include self-imposed planned timelines for each
action. Agencies would be required to include brief explanations for
deviations from the timeline. Under existing law, there are no reasongiving requirements whatsoever when an agency simply delays action unless
and until an agency is required to provide such an explanation by a court.
If agencies were required to sketch anticipated timetables in advance, and
to publish status updates that included candid reasons for any delay,
strategic restraint might become less objectionable. In addition to being
included in the Regulatory Agenda, these status updates could be offered
253
on the agency's website.
The kind of candor advocated in this section, however, has to date not
been rewarded. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Bush Administration cited its
concerns about the coordination of domestic GHG policy with negotiating
leverage for foreign treaties as a reason for denying the rulemaking petition,
but the Administration was rebuffed by the Court. After that decision,
agencies may be more inclined to keep their true reasoning to themselves.
But the natural and unavoidable pressures on administrative agencies to
consider the practical consequences of making a decision are unlikely to be
driven from the picture entirely; rather, they will be driven underground.
Massachusettsv. EPA provides an instructive example. While one method of
strategic inaction was foreclosed by the Court's decision, EPA availed itself
of an alternative strategy: delaying promulgation of an actual proposed rule
on GHGs by issuing an ANPRM. The ANPRM proposed various methods
of regulating GHG emissions and sought public comment and reactions.
In this way, the actual task of proposing and adopting new regulations was
postponed until President Obama took office.
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http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaMain.
According to former OIRA
Administrator Sally Katzen, "the process itself has become more of a paper exercise than an
analytical tool." Katzen, supra note 141, at I11.
253. Federal agencies have made great strides in recent years in modernizing their web
pages, with the result that information posted there is now much easier for the public to
locate. Of course, some agency websites are better than others. InformationWeek singled
out the Department of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), the Department of Homeland Security, the White House, and the U.S. Postal
Service for accolades in 2010, J. Nicholas Hoover, 12 Best Government Websites,
INFORMATIONWEEK (Aug. 26, 2010), http://www.informationweek.com/government/
information-management/12-best-government-websites/227100057?pgno= 1,while
GovLoop's favorites were the Department of Energy, the FCC, NASA, the White House,
and the National Archives. Jeff Ribeira, Top 5 US FederalAgency Websites in 2011, GovLooP
http://www.govloop.com/profles/blogs/top-5-government-agency(Dec. 28, 2011),
websites-201 1.
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Thus, exhortations to agencies to disclose prudential motivations for
deferring action must, to be successful, be coupled with the more
deferential standards of review for agency decisions articulated above that
acknowledge, in appropriate cases, the practical value of deciding not to
decide.
Of course, even with greater transparency by agencies, policing agency
restraint for evidence of malfeasance will miss some cases of poorly
motivated inaction and delay. Agencies might conceal their true
motivations for restraint, offering plausible alternative justifications for
avoiding certain questions. However, this problem is not unique to the
restraint context and exists any time courts review the reasonableness of
agency justifications. Moreover, to the extent a default must be selected, it
is preferable to allow some instances of agency shirking to stand than to
block the use of restraint as an administrative tool.
CONCLUSION

Agency restraint, no less than judicial restraint, is a fact of the legal
landscape. Administrative inaction has often been conceived of in a
pejorative sense. It conjures images of bureaucratic "red tape" such as lines
at the DMV or long waits for passport processing. In many cases, however,
the understanding of inaction as the product of agency misfeasance or
ineptitude is incorrect. We see agencies deferring decisions either wholesale
or in part, and making minimalist decisions, strategically, but for reasons
that are consistent with their missions and statutory mandates and designed
to preserve, rather than frustrate, expertise.
This Article has proposed that we should understand agency decisions
about whether, when and how much to decide as falling within three
categories: decisions not to decide, step-by-step regulation, and
administrative minimalism. What all of these behaviors have in common is
that they evince a desire, on the part of the agency, to avoid decisions that
would produce negative practical consequences.
Agencies must be pragmatic. Their position in government is far from
secure, given their lack of constitutional pedigree and the absence of direct
accountability to the electorate. Because they are particularly susceptible to
pushback from other actors, including not only their political principals but
the courts, states and the public, agencies must be especially sensitive to the
Deferring decisions, enacting programs
possible effects of backlash.
piecemeal, or substituting less controversial choices for more controversial
ones are all strategies that can help agencies avoid unwanted attention.
And because agencies have longer-term time horizons than elected
representatives, the strategy of sacrificing battles in order to win wars is
more workable.
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Fortunately, pragmatic agencies need not be unfaithful agencies. Most
statutes have sufficient flexibility built into them to permit agencies to
exercise discretion over the scope and timing of decisions. Faithfulness to
statutory mandates might even require flexibility in application in order to
effectuate all parts of the statute and other statutes the agency is tasked with
administering. A FERC that insisted on the unbundling of retail
transmission from retail sales as part of Order 888 might have found itself
unable to make any progress on new transmission siting, which requires
state cooperation. And an EPA that insisted on regulating the smallest
emitters of GHGs right away might find itself facing overwhelming political
opposition or regulatory fatigue that limited its ability to regulate GHGs
more broadly.
Moreover, in order to fulfill their statutory mandates most effectively,
agencies must balance expertise with flexibility. Bickel saw an inevitable
accommodation between the ideals of principle and flexibility. Neither one
could exist without the other. For agencies, too, it is often better to
preserve legitimacy by deferring a decision than to make a choice that
would provoke negative practical repercussions.
By separating the
pragmatic inquiry-the questions of whether, when and how much to decidefrom the substantive inquiry-what the decision should be-agencies can
preserve their technocratic focus on the back end while making room for
pragmatism at the front end.
Of course, we are left with the eternal problem of disentangling "good"
restraint from "bad" restraint, where "good" restraint is undertaken in
service of statutory goals and "bad" restraint is the product of lassitude, selfserving motivations by individual decisionmakers, or narrow interest-group
influence. One way to mitigate this problem would be to require greater
candor by agencies in justifying restraint. Agencies may be more willing to
disclose pragmatic concerns if those concerns are recognized as legitimate
under some of the standard tests for reviewing inaction, such as the
arbitrary and capricious test.
It will never be possible to eliminate poorly motivated choices
completely. We are then presented with a choice of two worlds: one in
which agencies' feet are held to the fire no matter how sensible their
justifications for restraint, and one in which some poorly motivated
instances of restraint are permitted as a consequence of allowing wellmotivated ones to stand. Unless we think agencies are determined shirkers,
a position this Article has challenged, there is no obvious reason for
favoring the former over the latter.
The initial exploration of the administrative state's passive virtues
presented in this Article suggests several directions for future research. The
Article surveyed several areas of administrative decisionmaking in order to
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provide as complete a picture as possible of the tools available to agencies
to defer action. However, a more targeted focus on a single agency or
single issue area, for example FERC or the regulation of GHGs, would
allow a more nuanced look at the practice of restraint in context. To better
understand individual actors' motivations for restraint, an ethnographic
survey of current and former administrative decisionmakers might also be
indicated. Just as Bickel was forced to rely on judicial opinions to explore
judges' true thinking, the case for the administrative state's passive virtues
presented here has of necessity largely relied on circumstantial evidence,
including motive evidence. While an ethnographic survey would be limited
in its effectiveness by the candor, or lack thereof, of the subjects
interviewed, former agency personnel in particular may be inclined to
provide frank responses.
Alexander Bickel first wrote about judicial prudentialism in the early
1960s, a half-century ago. Since that time, the already potent post-New
Deal federal bureaucracy has continued to expand and is now truly massive
in scope and responsibility. Its actions affect nearly every aspect of our
daily lives. It is therefore past time to begin a discussion of the
administrative state's own passive virtues.
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